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AS EVIDENCED BY COMMON SLOGANS like ‘lest we forget’ and let ‘bygones 
be bygones,’ ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’ play important social functions: 
We need to both learn from history and be able to move on from the past. The 
right to be forgotten that has entered global public consciousness in the last few 
years has inspired both concerns about suppressing history1 and reminders that 
total remembering is both new and damaging to data subjects and communities.2 
However, the impetus behind the right to be forgotten is less about grand social 
values of remembering and forgetting, and more about managing personal 
information flows in the digital age: It is about trying to address vast power 
imbalances between data subjects and various digital information brokers, 
including information location service providers such as search engines.3
In Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (“OPC”) 
recently proposed that the data protection regime governing the private sector, 
the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”), 
should be interpreted to obligate search engines to abide by fair information 
principles, in particular the principles of accuracy and appropriate purposes.4 
Applying PIPEDA to search engines would be a new practice, even though the 
1. Pierre Trudel, “La menace du « droit à l’oubli »” (11 April 2014), Blogues Pierre Truedel 
(blog), online: <www.journaldemontreal.com/2014/04/11/la-menace-du--droit-a-loubli>.
2. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Napoleon Xanthoulis, “The Right to Oblivion 
in the Information Age: A Human-Rights Based Approach” (2013) 10:1 US-China L 
Rev 84 at 96-97.
3. Julia Powles, “The Case That Won’t Be Forgotten” (2015) 47:2 Loy U Chicago LJ 583 at 586.
4. SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA]; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Draft OPC Position 
on Online Reputation (Gatineau, Que: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2018), 
online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/consultation-on-
online-reputation/pos_or_201801> [OPC, Draft OPC Position].
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OPC claims that it is merely applying the current legislation. As recently as 
2017, it seemed that only voluntary cooperation would be requested of search 
engines. For example, in the Federal Court’s affirmation of the OPC findings in 
AT v Globe24h.com, the defendant’s website was found to have violated PIPEDA 
when it scraped court and tribunal documents containing personal information 
from publicly accessible legal databases and allowed them to be indexed by general 
search engines.5 The Federal Court issued a declaratory court order, as endorsed 
by the OPC, which allowed the complainant to appeal to Google to honour its 
voluntary search alteration policies: The court did not directly issue an order to 
compel Google to do so.6
The European Union (“EU”), however, already requires search engines to 
honour complainants’ requests to remove personal information from search results 
in certain circumstances. The data protection regime in the EU characterizes 
search engines as primarily commercial business ventures that collect, process, 
and package information, regardless of the public nature of their sources.7 Search 
engine results are in this sense a product sold by the search engine company—not 
directly to the user, but rather to advertisers and other data brokers with an 
interest in search result content and compilation. If this understanding of search 
engine results as an information product were adopted in Canada, as currently 
proposed by the OPC, then a search engine company could be deemed to be 
subject to PIPEDA, in that it “collects, uses or discloses [personal information] in 
the course of commercial activities.”8 While the OPC has rightly suggested that it 
would be unreasonable to require search engines to abide by PIPEDA as a whole, 
in particular with regard to securing consent for all of its collection and use of 
5. AT v Globe24h.com, 2017 FC 114 at para 101, 407 DLR (4th) 733 [Globe24h]. See also 
Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information, SOR/2001-7 [RSPAI] (demonstrating 
that much of the reasoning in Globe24h involves interpretation of the RSPAI).
6. Globe24h, supra note 5 at para 86. See also AT v Globe24h.com, 2017 FCC 114 
(Memorandum from Privacy Commissioner of Canada, the Added Respondent, Added 
Respondent’s Record, Vol 4, Tab 6 at 1016-49, Federal Court File No T-1248-15).
7. European Commissioner, Viviane Reding, considers the right to be forgotten as merely 
strengthening existing obligations under European data protection law. See Bert-Jaap Koops, 
“Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ 
in Big Data Practice” (2011) 8:3 SCRIPTed 229 at 232-33, 244.
8. PIPEDA, supra note 4, s 4; OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4.
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personal information,9 there are nonetheless significant ways that PIPEDA could 
be applied in a workable and rights-balancing way. This article considers what a 
finding that search engines are subject to PIPEDA would mean, and how it could 
be justified and limited in a principled fashion that respects our commitment to 
privacy, access to information and freedom of expression. In other words, what 
would a Canadian right to be forgotten look like?
The right to be forgotten is generally recognized as arising from European 
sensibilities regarding personality rights.10 European privacy and identity rights 
provide strong protections for individual autonomy in the domain of identity 
formation and presentation, giving individuals more control over how they 
are discussed and portrayed in public. European data protection law operates 
as an outgrowth of this broader and stronger protection of citizens’ identity. 
This commitment is rooted in European emphasis on human dignity, respect 
for one’s ‘private life,’ and protection from damage to one’s reputation by 
either government or private actors.11 These rights are enshrined in multiple 
constitutional documents of the EU,12 and illustrate the more general trust that 
9. OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
Real Fears, Real Solutions: A plan for restoring confidence in Canada’s privacy regime, 2016-17 
Annual Report to Parliament on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act and the Privacy Act (Gatineau, Que: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
2017), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/media/4586/opc-ar-2016-2017_eng-final.pdf> [OPC 
Consent Report].
10. Ignacio Cofone, “Google v. Spain: A Right To Be Forgotten?” (2015) 15:1 Chi-Kent J Intl 
& Comp L 1 at 2; Meg Leta Ambrose, “It’s About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, 
and the Right to be Forgotten” (2013) 16:2 Stan Tech L Rev 369 at 380-81; Aidan Forde, 
“Implications of the Right to be Forgotten” (2015) 18:1 Tul J Tech & Intell Prop 83 at 85.
11. Ambrose, supra note 10 at 374; Meg Leta Ambrose & Jef Ausloos, “The Right to be 
Forgotten Across the Pond” (2013) 3 J Info Pol’y 1 at 14; Rolf H Weber, “The Right 
To Be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora’s Box?” (2011) 2:2 J Intell Prop Info Tech & 
E-Commerce L 120.
12. EC, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2012] OJ, C 326/02, arts 7-8; 
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
European Treaty Series No 005, art 8 (entered into force 4 November 1950), online: 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf>.
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European legal culture places in government regulation to protect these interests, 
and their distrust of private markets to do so.13
The United States, on the other hand, is often regarded as having the 
opposite of European sensibilities when it comes to personal information flow. 
In the United States, privacy is rooted in liberty rather than dignity, as a right 
to be ‘free from’ government interference in one’s private life, with far fewer and 
more limited restrictions placed on private actors.14 Constitutional protection for 
privacy only extends to unreasonable search and seizure, and any private rights 
to privacy are consequently derived from statute or common law and often lose 
out to the much stronger constitutional protection for freedom of speech, which 
is notoriously strong in the United States.15 US legal culture stresses an acute 
distrust of government regulation, and instead places much more trust in markets 
to deal with private problems.16
Canada tends to fall somewhere in between these two interpretations: Our 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not contain express protection for privacy 
beyond protection from unreasonable search and seizure—although Quebec’s 
additional Charter of human rights and freedoms does, and is closer to the European 
approach to privacy, using similar language in fostering respect for “private life.”17 
However, section 1 of the Canadian Charter has allowed privacy interests to be 
more readily balanced against freedom of expression than in the United States, 
as more restrictions can be justified as reasonable in a “free and democratic 
13. Franz Werro, “The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash” 
in Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al, eds, Haftungsrecht im dritten Millennium - Liability in 
the Third Millennium (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009) 287 at 299; Éloïse Gratton & Jules 
Polonetsky, Privacy above all other Fundamental Rights? Challenges with the Implementation 
of a Right to be Forgotten in Canada (Gatineau, Que: Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada, April 2016) at 2, online: <www.eloisegratton.com/files/sites/4/2016/04/
PolonetskyGratton_RTBFpaper_FINAL.pdf>. This report was submitted by Éloïse 
Gratton & Jules Polonetsky to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada as part 
of its consultation and call for essays on online reputation. See “Consultation on online 
reputation,” Office of the Privacy Commission of Canada, online <www.priv.gc.ca/en/
about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/consultation-on-online-reputation>.
14. James Q Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 
113:6 Yale LJ 1151 at 1214.
15. Ambrose, supra note 10 at 375.
16. Gratton & Polonetsky, supra note 13 at 2.
17. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]; Charter of human rights and 
freedoms, CQLR c C-12, s 5; arts 3, 35-36 CCQ. For discussion of the differences between 
Quebec and the rest of Canada regarding privacy and personality rights, see Gratton & 
Polonetsky, supra note 13.
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society.”18 Canada consequently approaches some issues of personal information 
flow differently than the United States—for example, publication bans to protect 
the privacy of some crime victims are constitutionally possible in Canada but not 
in the US.19 However, Canada has not embraced personality rights to the extent 
that the EU has, and significant recent gains in Canada for freedom of expression 
(specifically regarding publication of defamatory content) illustrate that Canada 
places more value on freedom of expression and less on protecting reputation 
than Europe.20 Canadian law on intermediary liability for information posted 
online by others is also less developed than in these jurisdictions.21
Discussions about the right to be forgotten are emerging along with the rapid 
development of our technology-based information landscape.22 Real concerns 
about actual and potential pervasive surveillance—from government, companies, 
peers, and the broader public—have resulted in heightened anxiety about being 
able to protect one’s identity and interests.23 Revelations of broad government 
surveillance of communications, commercial entities amassing vast quantities of 
data about consumer behaviour (including emotional responses to various stimuli, 
tracking online and app-enabled interactions with others, and geo-location 
technologies in many portable devices), as well as the explosion of social media, 
have fueled these concerns.24 Anonymity has always been a central strategy for 
protecting one’s privacy online,25 but it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
remain unidentified.26 We all now have large dossiers with data held by various 
18. Charter, supra note 17, s 1.
19. Canadian Newspapers Co v Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 122, 
52 DLR (4th) 690.
20. Iris Fischer & Adam Lazier, “Crookes v. Newton: The Supreme Court of Canada Brings 
Libel Law into the Internet Age” (2012) 50:1 Alta L Rev 205 at 217; Karen Eltis, “Can 
the Reasonable Person Still be ‘Highly Offended’? An Invitation to Consider the Civil Law 
Tradition’s Personality Rights–Based Approach to Tort Privacy” (2008) 5:1&2 UOLTJ 199.
21. Corey Omer, “Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad” (2014) 
28:1 Harv JL & Tech 289 at 305.
22. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 2.
23. Meg Leta Jones, Ctrl+Z: The Right to Be Forgotten (New York: New York 
University Press, 2016).
24. Colin J Bennett et al, Transparent Lives: Surveillance in Canada (Edmonton: Athabasca 
University Press, 2014).
25. Chris Hunt & Micah Rankin, “R. v. Spencer: Anonymity, the Rule of Law, and the 
Shrivelling of the Biographical Core” (2015) 61:1 McGill LJ 193; Carole Lucock & Michael 
Yeo, “Naming Names: The Pseudonym in the Name of the Law” (2006) 3:1 UOLTJ 53.
26. Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure 
of Anonymization” (2010) 57:6 UCLA L Rev 1701 at 1716-22; Bennett et al, 
supra note 24 at 19.
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public, private, and personal actors, with little knowledge of what is in them, 
and how they are combined (including from both private and public sources). 
Proponents of the right to be forgotten are attempting to intervene against this 
power imbalance.27
Search engines have become the primary means by which we find 
information, including of course about people: We search for people we know 
or hear about, and occasionally check our own names.28 Google has emerged as 
the worldwide leader in online search services, credited with over 90 per cent of 
the global market share.29 Google’s success has been attributed to its algorithms, 
by which the company processes information gathered from publicly available 
webpages and delivers the results in list form to a user, partly based on the user’s 
previous search history.30 The aim is to deliver the most relevant material at the 
top of the list. Information presented further down the list is deemed less relevant 
and most people do not even look at search results beyond the first page or two.31 
Online reputation management services have long profited from the willingness 
of companies and individuals to pay for techniques such as Search Engine 
Optimization (“SEO”) to manipulate search results so positive information rises 
to the top and negative information is pushed down the list.32 These services are 
expensive, however, so only wealthy individuals can benefit from this private 
regulation of information flow: Without a right to be forgotten, ordinary people 
are at the mercy of the algorithms.
Online identity—the profile that emerges when online information 
connected to a person’s name or other identifier is aggregated and made available 
to others—has increasingly become a central component of our social and 
professional lives. Youth are increasingly being taught about ‘self-branding’ as 
an important part of educational and professional success: They understand 
27. Bennett et al, supra note 24 at 55-69.
28. See Kerry Maxwell, “Buzzwords: Egosurfing” (30 April 2004), Macmillan Dictionary (blog), 
online: <www.macmillandictionary.com/buzzword/entries/egosurfing.html>.
29. For up to date statistics on search engine market share by country or worldwide, see Global 
Stats, “Browser Market Share Worldwide” (January 2018), online: <gs.statcounter.com/
search-engine-market-share>.
30. Randall Stross, Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything We Know 
(New York: Free Press, 2008).
31. Alexander JAM van Deursen & Jan AGM van Dijk, “Using the Internet: Skill related 
problems in users’ online behavior” (2009) 21:5&6 Interacting with Computers 393.
32. Search Engine Land, “What is SEO/Search Engine Optimization,” online: 
<searchengineland.com/guide/what-is-seo>; Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 2 at 220-21; 
Jeffrey Rosen, “The Web Means the End of Forgetting,” The New York Times (21 July 2010), 
online: <www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all>.
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that online identity is central to many forms of social evaluation.33 Lisa Austin 
described privacy as the regime by which we secure and bolster the conditions 
for self-formation and presentation, online and off. She argued that data 
protection principles establish the ground rules for creating and safeguarding 
an identity-favourable environment.34 The problem with pervasive surveillance, 
then, is its possible effects on identity formation, revision, and tailoring to suit 
various social interactions.35 It can stifle one’s capacity to express “yourself freely 
in the here and now.”36 Erving Goffman noted that every individual has multiple 
identities, and that social interaction is built on which ‘face’ is put forward in 
a particular relational context.37 With the explosion of data collection from so 
many different directions and via so many channels, we have been rapidly losing 
the capacity to meaningfully influence, much less control, this process.38 The 
right to be forgotten, in its various forms, has the goal of allotting data subjects 
greater control over the flow of information about them.39
This article explores what a Canadian variant of the right to be forgotten 
might look like in relation to search engines as a particular type of business that 
collects and packages publicly available personal information about individuals.40 
33. Alice E Marwick, Status Update: Celebrity, Publicity, and Branding in the Social Media Age 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).
34. Lisa M Austin, “Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification” (2010) 
55:2 McGill LJ 165.
35. danah boyd, It’s Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked Teens (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2014).
36. Koops, supra note 7 at 233, cited in Antoinette Rouvroy, “Réinventer l’art d’oublier et de se 
faire oublier dans la société de l’Information? version augmentée du chapitre paru, sous le 
même titre” in Stéphanie Lacour, ed, La sécurité de l’individu numérisé Réflexions prospectives 
et internationales (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007) 249 at 271-72.
37. Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays In Face-To-Face Behavior (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Company, 1967); Austin, supra note 34; Vincent Miller, “A Crisis of Presence: 
On-line Culture and Being in the World” (2012) 16:3 Space & Polity 265.
38. Social media platforms, especially Facebook, have attempted to address their users’ concerns 
about losing control over their online identity by creating simple tools like being able to 
“untag” one’s photo someone else has posted. See Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, 
“Oblivion: The Right to be Different…from Oneself: Re-proposing the Right to Be 
Forgotten” in Alessia Ghezzi, Ângela Guimarães Pereira & Lucia Vesnić-Alujević, eds, The 
Ethics of Memory in a Digital Age: Interrogating the Right to be Forgotten (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014) 65.
39. Forde, supra note 10 at 93; Orla Lynskey, “Deconstructing Data Protection: The ‘Added 
Value’ of a Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order” (2014) 63:3 ICLQ 569 at 581; 
Powles, supra note 3 at 585.
40. For a more in-depth discussion of privacy in publicly accessible information in 
Canada, see Andrea Slane, “Information Brokers, Fairness, and Privacy in Publicly 
Accessible Information” 4 Can J Comp & Contemp L [forthcoming in 2018] [Slane, 
“Information Brokers”].
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Part I will consider the different versions of this ‘right’ in the EU, specifically 
obscurity, oblivion, and erasure. In particular, it will explore how the EU deals 
with publicly and indirectly collected information, given that until now data 
protection regimes generally have not regulated the collection and processing of 
such information. Part II will consider the digital information dynamics related to 
publicly available personal information, and what the normative impetus behind 
regulating these information dynamics might be. It will include a discussion of the 
difference between what search engines do and what news sources do, and how it 
may be possible to restrict the former while preserving the importance of expression 
and access to information regarding the latter. Part III explores the possibility 
of dividing publicly available personal information into three subcategories: 
information that should not have been published in the first place; information 
that is publicly available from public sector sources, but to which public access has 
been legitimately restricted; and information that, while legitimately and publicly 
available, has been given more prominence than warranted by way of a search 
engine’s algorithm. Also important is whether this information has caused the 
data subject some harm.41 It also considers the current Canadian approach to each 
of these categories, and explores how the right to be forgotten might fit into our 
already established or developing normative approaches to personal information 
flow. Part III concludes by suggesting a creative solution to the especially complex 
and novel dynamics of information flow.
I. VERSIONS OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN: 
OBSCURITY, OBLIVION, ERASURE
The idea of the right to be forgotten has been around for a couple of decades 
even in Canada,42 but it blossomed into public consciousness in North America 
41. Canadian scholars tend to require that a complainant demonstrate harm caused by the 
accessibility of the information in order to justify obscurity or erasure. This is not a requirement 
in the EU regulation. See Geneviève Saint-Laurent, “Vie privée et «Droit à L’oubli »: Que Fait 
Le Canada?” (2015) 66 UNBLJ 185 at 195; Gratton & Polonetsky, supra note 13.
42. In the latter part of the 1990s, the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner 
mentioned the “right to be forgotten” in at least two rulings. See Office of the Information 
and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, Inquiry RE: A decision by the Ministry of 
Finance and Corporate relations to withhold the names and addresses of property owners from 
copies of Certificates of Forfeiture (6 March 1998), Order No 217-1998, online: OIPC <www.
oipc.bc.ca/orders/438>; Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British 
Columbia, Inquiry RE: A decision by the Victoria Police Department to sever information and 
withhold law enforcement records from an applicant (12 October 1995), Order No 58-1995, 
online: OIPC <www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/405>.
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after the 2014 decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) 
Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datas (AEPD), 
Mario Costeja González.43 The nature of the right to be forgotten which emerges 
from that decision is fairly narrow. It identifies in what circumstances a data 
subject may demand that an information location service (i.e., a search engine) 
de-link certain search results for a subject’s name.44 This version of the right is 
more accurately described as a right to obscurity: The content at issue remains 
available at the source, and may be located using other search terms.
Following the Google Spain decision, the EU proposed explicitly 
enshrining the right to be forgotten in a revision of its data protection directive. 
EU Commissioner Viviane Reding described this move as merely making an 
existing right clearer, rather than creating a new right.45 However, it remains 
unclear as to how the new regulation will apply to search engines.46 The new 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) applies as of 25 May 2018, and 
includes a right to erasure—also referred to as a right to be forgotten—which 
enables data subjects to request erasure of their personal information held by 
data controllers under a list of circumstances, and subject to a list of exceptions.47 
This newly specified right is the right to have information deleted at the source. 
It strengthens existing obligations for data controllers who privately collect 
43. Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja 
González, C-131/12, [2014] ECR I-317 [Google Spain].
44. Julia Kerr has expressed concern that the Google Spain decision did not adequately define the 
meaning of search engine. She explains the importance of distinguishing between general 
search engines such as Google from internal search engines such as court or government 
websites. See Julia Kerr, “What is a Search Engine? The Simple Question the Court of Justice 
of the European Union Forgot to Ask and What It Means for the Future of the Right to Be 
Forgotten” (2016) 17:1 Chicago J Intl L 217 at 221.
45. Viviane Reding, “The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard 
Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age” (Address delivered at 
the Digital-Life-Design Conference, Munich, Germany 22 January 2012), online: 
European Commission Press Release Database <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH 
-12-26_en.htm>.
46. Ibid. Reding describes the right to be forgotten in terms of consent and control: “If an 
individual no longer wants his personal data to be processed or stored by a data controller, 
and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data should be removed from their 
system.” Determining what constitutes “legitimate reasons” for keeping information 
accessible is a more complex process when it comes to the information publicly available on 
search engines as compared with data that was provided directly by a customer to a business.
47. EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
[2016] OJ, L 119/1, art 17 [GDPR].
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consumer information, but also appears to apply in some measure to publicly 
collected information.48
In tracing the origins of rights to obscurity or erasure, several scholars have 
cited the longer-standing continental European tradition of a ‘right to oblivion,’ 
which is a strongly enforced version of a ‘clean slate’ policy for certain past 
mistakes.49 Mostly, the right to oblivion relates to criminal history information 
that is prohibited from being republished after individuals have resolved their 
entanglement with the justice system.50 Various European countries have 
suppressed factual publications (news articles, documentary television programs, 
films, et cetera), upon complaints by the offender or the offender’s family that 
reviving information about past crimes impinges on the rights of the offender.51 
While many jurisdictions have some variation of clean slate policies for certain 
past events, the information about these past events continues to reside at its 
original official source, so it is not truly ‘erased’ the way that privately collected 
information might be. The right to oblivion is therefore something other than 
a right to erasure, dealing specifically with suppressing wider publication of 
outdated information housed in public records: It is perhaps more accurately a 
hybrid of erasure and obscurity, as elaborated below.
A. OBSCURITY
The Google Spain case began in 2009 when the complainant, Mario Costeja 
González, sought to suppress archived announcements from 1998 that 
publicized forced auctions of his properties to satisfy social security debts.52 The 
announcements, somewhat inexplicably, appeared prominently on searches for 
his name, and so he asked the newspaper that housed the announcements in 
its online archive to delete them; when it refused, he asked Google to de-link 
48. So far, Google has implemented the more limited holding in Google Spain to deal with 
requests to alter search engine results linked to a data subject’s name. The company rejects 
over half of the requests they receive. It remains to be seen whether the new regulation will 
change how search engines are expected to respond to requests, and how much it would 
disrupt the balancing of interests in publicly available information that Google has thus 
far maintained.
49. Saint-Laurent, supra note 41; Cofone, supra note 10 at 2; Ambrose, supra note 10 at 380-81; 
Forde, supra note 10 at 85.
50. Werro, supra note 13.
51. Ibid at 290-91. Werro discusses several of these cases including AG v W, BGE 122 
III 449 (1996) and A v Journal de Genève et de la Gazette de Lausanne, 23 10/2003, 
5C156/2003 (2003).
52. Google Spain, supra note 43 at para 14.
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the archives from searches of his name.53 When Google also refused, Costeja 
González complained to the Spanish data protection authority (“AEPD”), which 
denied his complaint against the newspaper but supported his complaint against 
Google.54 Google appealed to the Audiencia Nacional (National High Court of 
Spain) which stayed proceedings in order to request that the CJEU rule on key 
preliminary questions, including whether the Data Protection Directive55 applies 
to search engines when they gather publicly available information from the 
Internet, and if so, under what circumstances a search engine would be required 
to cease processing personal information collected that way.56
The CJEU determined that Google does collect personal data through its 
web crawlers and processes the information through its algorithms:
Therefore, it must be found that, in exploring the internet automatically, constantly 
and systematically in search of the information which is published there, the operator 
of a search engine “collects” such data which it subsequently “retrieves,” “records” and 
“organises” within the framework of its indexing programmes, “stores” on its servers 
and, as the case may be, “discloses” and “makes available” to its users in the form of 
lists of search results. As those operations are referred to expressly and unconditionally 
in Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46, they must be classified as “processing” within the 
meaning of that provision, regardless of the fact that the operator of the search engine 
also carries out the same operations in respect of other types of information and does 
not distinguish between the latter and the personal data.57
Interesting in this conclusion is that the CJEU did not accept Google’s 
argument that its automated web crawlers do not distinguish between personal 
and other information and do not assert any influence over the content available 
on third-party sites, and so Google should not be considered to ‘control’ the 
personal data it gathers. The CJEU instead found that Google is in fact a 
‘data controller’ for the purposes of the Data Protection Directive, because it 
determines both the purpose and the means of processing the personal data that 
it collects and packages via its algorithms and monetizes this process by selling 
advertising related to that collated and packaged personal information.58
53. Ibid at para 15.
54. Ibid at paras 16-17.
55. EC, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, [1995] OJ, L 281 [Data Protection Directive]. The Data Protection 
Directive was repealed by GDPR, supra note 47.
56. Google Spain, supra note 43 at para 20.
57. Ibid at para 28.
58. Ibid at paras 32-33. For discussion see David Hoffman, Paula Bruening & Sophia Carter, 
“The Right to Obscurity: How We Can Implement the Google Spain Decision” (2016) 17:3 
NCJL & Tech 437 at 447-48; Saint-Laurent, supra note 41.
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Ultimately, the CJEU determined that upon request by a data subject, search 
engines must remove “inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant or excessive”59 
information generated upon a search of a person’s name unless there is a public 
interest in retaining the link to that information.60 The CJEU considered the 
specific role that search engines play in processing personal data: Both in terms 
of locating information about the data subject that users would have far more 
difficulty finding by other means61 and in terms of creating and delivering an 
online profile of the data subject to users (i.e., “obtaining through the list of 
results a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that 
can be found on the Internet enabling them to establish a more or less detailed 
profile of the data subject”).62 The court found that the unique effect of this 
compiled list of results is potentially greater than any one result contained on the 
list, because the list as a whole:
[P]otentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and which, without 
the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been only with 
great difficulty—and thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile of him. 
Furthermore, the effect of the interference with those rights of the data subject 
is heightened on account of the important role played by the internet and search 
engines in modern society, which render the information contained in such a list of 
results ubiquitous.63
In Canada, the type of information that would be eligible for de-listing 
from a person’s name search would be evaluated with respect to the principles 
of accuracy, purpose, and consent, along with the overarching requirement of 
reasonableness, rather than relevance, adequacy, or excessiveness, which are terms 
that PIPEDA does not share with the Data Protection Directive. The accuracy 
principle requires that “[p]ersonal information shall be as accurate, complete, 
and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used,” and 
the OPC has taken the position that this principle applies to search engines, 
signifying that data subjects have a right to challenge the accuracy, completeness, 
and currency of personal information and to have this information amended 
where it is inaccurate, incomplete, or out of date.64 The OPC also proposes that 
the appropriate purposes principle should apply,65 and that:
59. Google Spain, supra note 43 at paras 92-94. The terms in the Google Spain decision are drawn 
from the Data Protection Directive. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 55, art 6.
60. Google Spain, supra note 43 at paras 81, 97.
61. Ibid at para 36.
62. Ibid at para 37.
63. Ibid at para 80.
64. PIPEDA, supra note 4, Schedule 1, Principle 4.6; OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4.
65. PIPEDA, supra note 4, s 5(3).
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[T]here are a certain number of limited circumstances in which a reasonable 
person would not consider it appropriate that specific content containing personal 
information is identified by a search engine as ‘relevant’ in relation to a search of an 
individual’s name and given prominent placement in search results.66
The regulation governing the publicly available information exception to the 
consent requirement67 also pivots on the purpose for which that information was 
collected, used, or disclosed. Publicly-available information (meaning, generally, 
information originating or housed in a public sector source) can be collected, 
used, or disclosed without consent only where this further collection, use, 
or disclosure of the personal information relates directly to the purpose for which 
the information originally appears in the directory, listing, notice, registry, record, 
or document in which it was found.68 The OPC and the Federal Court denied 
the shelter of this exception to Globe24h, reasoning that as a commercial website 
whose interest was primarily in profit, it did not disclose the personal information 
it collected from publicly available legal databases for a purpose directly related 
to the original purpose for which a litigant has given consent—namely in the 
spirit of the open court principle.69 This reasoning could be extended to consider 
whether personal information that has been made publicly available complies 
with the appropriate purposes principle to begin with, as will be elaborated on 
in Part III below.
In Canada, expectations of privacy, including expectations with regard to 
data protection, must be reasonable.70 The purpose provision of PIPEDA brings 
this home: “[I]n an era in which technology increasingly facilitates the circulation 
and exchange of information,” PIPEDA’s purpose is to provide:
rules to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a manner 
that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal 
information and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal 
66. OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4.
67. PIPEDA, supra note 4, ss 7(1)(d), 7(2)(c.1), 7(3)(h.1).
68. RSPAI, supra note 5, ss 1(a)-1(d); More controversially, this regulation limits the “publicly 
available exception” where the information appears in a publication (including a magazine, 
book or newspaper). This makes it more difficult to collect, use, and disclose personal 
information even when the renewed disclosure relates directly to the purpose for which the 
information originally shared. As a result of the fact that there is an additional exception for 
the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for journalistic, artistic, or literary 
purposes, this regulation addresses information shared for different reasons (ibid, s 1(e)).
69. Globe24h, supra note 5.
70. Andrea Slane & Lisa M Austin, “What’s In a Name? Privacy and Citizenship in the 
Voluntary Disclosure of Subscriber Information in Online Child Exploitation Investigations” 
(2011) 57:4 Crim LQ 486.
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information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in 
the circumstances.71
These circumstances could include collection and collation of publicly 
available information along the lines of the CJEU’s reasons, and a “reasonable 
person” standard in relation to such an activity could translate into what is 
normatively appropriate to include in search results of publicly available materials, 
broadly understood. A fuller analysis of how such a normatively appropriate 
standard might be crafted—having regard to the freedom of expression interests 
not just of the organizations subject to PIPEDA but more importantly the users 
of their service—will need to consider what may be different about the kind of 
personal information collection that search engines do. As the OPC acknowledges, 
it is clearly not appropriate to require a search engine to abide by all of the PIPEDA 
requirements.72 However, it may well be appropriate to require the search engine 
to address particular problems with personal information flows that are created 
or exacerbated by the search engine’s presentation of search results.73
This is clearly not how search engines currently work. Indeed, Google’s 
algorithms do not currently consider the purposes for which consent may or may 
not have been given when they collect and collate public websites containing 
personal information, but are instead focused on meeting expectations of 
relevance for users and clients (e.g., advertisers). Google tailors its search results 
to users depending on previous searches, so a user who has previously shown an 
interest in, for example, humiliating information about people who clearly never 
consented to its publication, will likely find it again. If the point is to balance 
privacy with Google’s business interests in delivering what people are looking 
for, whether it is normatively reasonable for a person to be able to easily locate 
humiliating information about a person is a different question. Google’s decisions 
about which requested search removals under European privacy law to honour 
and which to deny are made by real people, not algorithms, so these decisions are 
better able to accommodate normative expectations.74 This normative approach 
is what the CJEU aimed for in Google Spain, in that the nature of the public 
interest at stake is very specific: It is not whether the public interest is served by 
71. PIPEDA, supra note 4, s 3.
72. OPC Consent Report, supra note 9 at 15-16; Michael Rosenstock, “Is there a ‘right to 
be forgotten’ in Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA)?” (2016) 14:1 CJLT 131 at 147.
73. Ibid at 151.
74. Google Transparency Report Help Center, “European privacy requests Search removals 
FAQs,” online: <www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq> at FAQ: 
“Who makes decisions about requests to delist content?” [Google FAQs].
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the existence of the information, but whether it is in the public interest that the 
information remains accessible by searching the data subject’s name.75
Google has developed parameters for deciding what sorts of search removal 
requests to honour according to the Article 29 Working Party guidelines.76 It uses 
a four-step evaluation process, the most difficult questions being: “Does the 
page requested for removal include information that is inadequate, irrelevant, 
no longer relevant, or excessive, based on the information that the requester 
provides? Is there a public interest in that information remaining available in 
search results generated by a search for the requester’s name?”77
The specifics of this evaluation process, like the algorithm by which the 
information turns up in the first place, are shrouded in mystery. Nonetheless, 
Google has disclosed that common scenarios for delisting pages are a “clear absence 
of public interest,” “sensitive information,” “content relating to minors,” and 
“spent convictions/exonerations/acquittals for crimes.”78 Requests have involved 
a wide range of websites, with the top ten sites accounting for only a fraction of 
requests (Facebook is the top site, and none of the top sites is a traditional news 
outlet).79 With regard to traditional news content, Google provides examples 
of requests it has honoured and requests it has rejected, making it apparent 
that it will generally grant requests made by private individuals in relation to 
minor incidents (including minor, long ago crimes), but not those made by 
public figures or people who have abused the public’s trust (e.g., by professional 
75. Google Spain, supra note 43 at para 97. See OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4 
(demonstrating that the OPC has adopted this approach in its proposed position: “[T]he 
question is not whether the underlying information serves the public interest in the abstract, 
but whether its continued availability in search results for searches of an individual’s name is 
in the public interest”).
76. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union Judgment on ‘Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González’ C131/12” WP 225 (adopted 
26 November 2014), online: <www.dataprotection.ro/servlet/ViewDocument?id=1080> 
[WP29 Guidelines].
77. Google FAQs, supra note 74 at FAQ: “How do you evaluate requests?”.
78. Ibid at FAQ: “What are some common scenarios for delisting pages?”.
79. Google, “Transparency Report: Search removals under European privacy law,” (accessed on 
16 April 2018), online: <www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy> 
[Google, “Transparency Report”].
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misconduct), and not those involving major crimes or incidents.80 Google has 
processed hundreds of thousands of requests, and has honoured fewer than half 
of these.81 Very few decisions not to remove links have been appealed by the data 
subject, so the decisions do not appear to be outrageously out of line.82
The right to obscurity—in the form of de-listing certain search results from 
a search of a person’s name through a data protection regime—involves balancing 
multiple interests: Those of the data location business (Google) and the data 
subject, but also potentially of the source content providers, and the public who 
use the data location services. The latter two interests generally do not come into 
play when regulating how businesses privately and directly collect and process 
personal information from their customers, so the balancing required to be 
“reasonable” in the Canadian context under PIPEDA will evolve in that it will 
need to better accommodate freedom of expression interests.83 Canadian courts 
have considered freedom of expression interests in the information on websites, 
and at least in the indirect role of search engines (like Google) in finding it: None 
of those cases precludes the implementation of a more tempered version of the 
right to be forgotten, rooted in modifying the application of PIPEDA such that 
it is more attentive to freedom of expression.84
In the wake of Google Spain in the EU, it is clear that there are ways to 
devise a right to be forgotten that would take a broader set of interests into 
consideration (search engine, data subject, content provider, and user). Google 
has taken voluntary steps to enhance the balancing of interests in their removal 
request process. For example, it has chosen to implement a notification 
practice to inform source content providers that a URL has been de-listed. 
Such notification is not required by EU data protection law, but the Article 29 
Working Party acknowledged that search engines may choose to do so, provided 
80. Ibid. The OPC has similarly come up with a distilled list of factors to consider when assessing 
whether the algorithm has failed to appropriately balance a data subject’s privacy with the 
public interest in maintaining easy access to particular results, namely: whether the individual 
is a public figure, and whether the information relates to a matter of public controversy or 
debate, an individual’s private or professional life, a criminal offence for which an individual 
received a discharge, pardon or record suspension, or information relating to a minor. See 
OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4.
81. Google has processed 669,848 requests pertaining to 2,488,228 URLs and has removed 
43.9% of these. See Google, “Transparency Report,” supra note 79 (accessed on 
16 April 2018).
82. Powles, supra note 3 at 602.
83. Rosenstock, supra note 72 at 150.
84. Globe24h, supra note 5; Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34, [2017] 1 SCR 
824 [Equustek]; Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 SCR 269 [Crookes].
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that the notifications do not identify who made the request.85 This practice has 
drawn some criticism as news agencies have jumped to conclusions, sometimes 
incorrectly, about which person’s name has been de-listed.86 Google also allows 
webmasters to ask for re-review of its decision to de-list a URL, although this 
too is not required by the data protection regime.87 Implementing a process for 
de-listing publicly available information in Canada—especially information that 
is lawfully published—would require a means for a content provider to complain 
and escalate a complaint, similar to the complaint process available to data 
subjects under PIPEDA.
The freedom of expression interests of search engine users have so far not 
been straightforwardly accommodated in the implementation of the European 
right to be forgotten. Google suggested that users should be notified when their 
search results may have been altered due to privacy requests,88 although such 
notification is inconsistent with Google’s current model whereby users are not 
informed of Google’s own editing and manipulating of search results. Google’s 
existing search alteration practices and policies remain a strong argument against 
Google’s claim that it is merely providing a list of sites publicly available on the 
web and that tampering with it would impinge upon the right of users to access 
that information.89 Indeed, private companies’ culling objectionable material—
much of it not illegal—from search results or news feeds is a sticky problem for 
freedom of expression online. Private companies are not held to constitutional 
standards of freedom of expression, and indeed their success in part depends 
on their capacity to avoid delivering shocking or distasteful content to users 
who do not actively choose to see such material.90 With regard to search results 
in particular, the user perspective is also difficult to entirely integrate with the 
85. WP29 Guidelines, supra note 76 at 2-3, 7.
86. Powles, supra note 3 at 597-98.
87. Google FAQs, supra note 74 at FAQ: “Do webmasters have any way of challenging 
your decisions?”.
88. Christopher Berzins, “The Right to be Forgotten After Google Spain: Is it Coming to 
Canada?” (2015) 28:3 Can J Admin L & Prac 267 at 270.
89. Equustek, supra note 84 (Factum of the Appellant at para 24), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/
WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/36602/FM010_Appellant_Google-Inc.pdf> [Equustek 
FOA]; Equustek, supra note 84 (Factum of the Respondent at para 22), online: <www.scc-csc.
ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/36602/FM020_Respondent_Equustek-Solutions-Inc.
pdf> [Equustek FOR]; Equustek, supra note 84 at para 50 (demonstrating that the SCC sided 
with the respondent: “[Google] acknowledges, fairly, that it can, and often does, exactly what 
is being asked of it in this case, that is, alter search results”).
90. Kyle Langvardt, “Regulating Online Content Moderation,” 106:5 Geo LJ 
[forthcoming in 2018].
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algorithmic logic of delivering the most ‘relevant’ results with a right of access to 
information. In putting forth a theory that search engines operate as ‘advisors’ 
rather than as mere conduits or more active editors, James Grimmelman states, 
“[f ]rom a user’s perspective, relevance is a subjective goal. But from a search 
engine’s perspective, search rankings are approximations of objectively but 
imperfectly observable characteristics of subjective user preferences, embodied 
in the search engine’s choices about its algorithms.”91 Users are therefore never 
entitled to any results in particular, only the list of sites that the search engine has 
compiled in its imperfect estimation of what the user is looking for.
Of course, a private company’s choice to restrict access to certain information 
is not subject to the Charter the way that government-mandated restriction of 
that information would be. Application of PIPEDA would have to be justified 
under section 1 of the Charter which would require sufficient clarity about how 
PIPEDA would apply to the provision of search results. As a service that presents 
advice to users as to what sites they might find relevant to their search needs, the 
search engine might also assert its own speech rights as connected to the rights of 
users, as Google argued in Equustek:
The injunction directly limits both Google’s speech (by prohibiting it from 
truthfully reporting to users the existence of publicly accessible websites) and that of 
the public (by preventing them from using Google’s search engine to find and access 
information that is publicly available on the Internet). The fact that there may be 
a justification for limiting the Defendants’ speech should not allow a court to order 
Google, or any search engine, to inaccurately report the non-existence of a website 
that remains on the Internet.92
However, the general argument that no legal mechanism can compel a search 
engine to de-list or de-index certain search results and still be Charter-compliant 
was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”). The Court concluded 
that issuing a preliminary injunction ordering Google to de-index the websites 
of the defendant company, whereby it persistently infringed the intellectual 
property rights of the plaintiff, was not contrary to anyone’s freedom of expression 
interests—The analysis of PIPEDA–based privacy requests to de-list links is 
therefore likely to similarly depend on the expression interests at stake in a given 
request or category of requests, as per the typology set out in Part III below.93
91. James Grimmelmann, “Speech Engines” (2014) 98:3 Minn L Rev 868 at 915.
92. Equustek FOA, supra note 89 at para 27 [emphasis in original].
93. Ibid at paras 48-49.
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B. OBLIVION
While the additional applications of a data subject’s right to control their personal 
information in the EU may seem new, many scholars have pointed to the droit à 
l’oubli and related rights in some European countries as a longer tradition informing 
a right to suppress publication of especially ‘outdated’ information. The passage 
of time is one factor that might make publicly accessible information no longer 
relevant and thus subject to a right to oblivion—a somewhat stronger variant 
of the right to obscurity. In Europe, this right means that in some jurisdictions 
public mention of a person’s criminal history, for example, is an actionable wrong 
unless there are compelling public interest reasons to revive publicity of these 
past wrongs.94 However, the right to oblivion is not a right to complete erasure. 
As with most ‘clean slate’ policies, a record of past wrongs (or financial troubles, 
such as bankruptcies) continues to exist, usually in a government database, which 
may allow public access, though often on a restricted basis.
As applied in the EU, the droit à l’oubli obliges search engines, including 
news sites, to de-index or de-list sites that mention spent criminal convictions, 
except where the public interest requires retaining easy public access to that 
information. Google has posted examples of its practice of de-listing sources from 
name searches to news sources that reference minor past criminal convictions, 
but Google does not appear to have wholly de-indexed any sites referencing past 
convictions. This obligation is complicated by divergent understandings of what 
search engines are doing when search results include an old news story (or an 
old announcement, as was the case in Google Spain): Are they republishing that 
information anew, thereby reviving interest in the outdated information? Or are 
they merely pointing to a historical source?
Google regularly argues that it is presenting neutral reference to the existence 
of websites that house this information, including, as noted above, in Equustek. 
Julia Powles issued a strong critique of that line of argument in Google Spain, that 
interfering with search results would distort truth, history, and public memory.95 
Powles asserted that search engines and other Internet service providers have 
long capitalized on the perception that the Internet is a public sphere, or a vast 
public archive, when really it has always been a network of privately owned and 
controlled networks.96 These privately owned networks are designed to benefit 
these companies. What does or does not remain publicly available should not 
94. Werro, supra note 13 at 291.
95. Powles, supra note 3 at 585.
96. Ibid at 591.
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be equated with the value we place in true public records and archives that are 
important to the democratic pillar of transparency and preservation of history.97
Canada’s access to information regime balances the right to access 
government information with privacy rights on a regular basis, and continually 
adjusts and refines the parameters of this balance. In Ontario (Community Safety 
and Correctional Services) v Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), the 
SCC affirmed lower court rulings and the finding of Ontario’s Information and 
Privacy Commissioner ordering release of the requested information, holding 
that the personal information exemption did not apply because the information 
did not present a reasonable risk of being connected with a particular individual 
(here, release of data regarding the number of registered sex offenders residing 
within areas captured by the first three digits of Ontario postal codes).98 Amy 
Conroy and Teresa Scassa, however, argue that the SCC was perhaps too confident 
that this information will remain de-identified in the age of data mining, and 
suggested instead that decisions on whether to release government-held personal 
information should rest on whether the release expressly furthers the values of 
transparency and accountability.99 In other words, a decision about public release 
of information should be justified by its purpose (here, being in the service of 
government transparency and accountability), rather than confusing release of 
information itself with transparency and accountability.
Canadian information policy has also recognized that not all sensitive personal 
information should be held in archives, no matter how historically significant the 
context in which that information was initially recorded may be.100 In Canada 
(Attorney General) v Fontaine, survivors of abuse in government-sponsored 
residential schools had been promised confidentiality of the highly sensitive 
personal information they provided in the course of the Independent Assessment 
Process under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement. Despite 
strong advocacy by the Canadian National Archive and others that this testimony 
should be preserved and retained in a protected archive, the Court ruled that 
the affected individuals had a right to choose whether to have records of their 
testimony preserved or destroyed.101
97. Ibid.
98. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v Ontario (Information and Privacy 
Commissioner), 2014 SCC 31 at paras 59-66, [2014] 1 SCR 674.
99. Amy Conroy & Teresa Scassa, “Promoting Transparency While Protecting Privacy in Open 
Government in Canada” (2015) 53:1 Alta L Rev 175.
100. Canada (Attorney General) v Fontaine, 2017 SCC 47, [2017] 2 SCR 205.
101. Ibid at para 62.
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Certainly, Canadian freedom of expression jurisprudence does not support 
prohibitions on republishing or reviving interest in past events, and imposing any 
such prohibitions on news archives or on returning search results related to news 
archives would surely violate section 2(b) of the Charter. However, Canadian 
information access policy is more nuanced about the balance between privacy 
and public access to information, indicating that some form of obscurity or 
oblivion for access to records of past events may well be in keeping with broader 
normative values regarding information flow.
C. ERASURE
The new EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 explicitly sets out 
a “right to erasure” which it also labels as a “right to be forgotten,” terminology 
which might fan the flames of concerns about “rewriting history.”102 The regulation 
creates a substantive right for a data subject to request removal of personal data 
from data controllers for a list of circumstances. Some of these involve violation 
of existing data protection principles, including where personal information is no 
longer necessary in relation to the purpose for which is was collected, where the 
data subject withdraws the consent on which processing was based, and where 
the personal information was unlawfully processed.103 In these circumstances, 
the right to erasure adds a direct remedy for data subjects in addition to existing 
constraints on business use of information collected from customers. The right to 
erasure also applies where the data subject objects to processing of their data.104
The right to object applies to all processing of data, including the kind of 
processing involved in “big data” analytics as well as the processing of publicly 
accessible data by a search engine. Overall, the regulation stresses balancing the 
interests that must be considered in granting erasure, stating that lawful data 
processing includes where “processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest,” and where:
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.105
102. GDPR, supra note 47, art 17; Will Gore, “The Only Way is Ethics - Is the ‘right to be 
forgotten’ being used to rewrite history?” The Independent (15 November 2015), online: 
<www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-only-way-is-ethics-is-the-right-to-be-forgotten-being-
used-to-rewrite-history-a6735346.html>.
103. GDPR, supra note 47, art 17.
104. Ibid, art 21.
105. Ibid, art 6(1)(e)-(f ).
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Article 17 further reiterates that the right to erasure will not apply where 
the processing is necessary to exercise a competing right, including freedom of 
expression and information, performance of a task carried out in the public interest, 
processing in the service of archiving in the public interest, or historical, scientific 
or statistical research purposes “where erasure is likely to render impossible or 
seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing.”106
For search engines, erasure is actually “de-indexing.” Unless the right to 
erasure is successfully enforced against the actual source of the content, the 
personal information remains at the source, but ceases to be returned in any search 
results on that search engine’s service. This form of erasure—as implemented 
by an information location service—is actually more a form of hyper-obscurity, 
in the sense that while the information continues to exist at the source, it can no 
longer be found through the search engine. In order to locate the information, 
it would be necessary to know the URL and enter it into a browser. Therefore, 
the right to erasure and its search engine variant of complete de-indexing is a 
means to bolster existing data protection principles that support the autonomy 
rights of data subjects, but extends that protection to a broader range of data 
processing practices: Profiling of online users (“big data” gathered from public 
online activity) and where publicly accessible information is being collected, 
collated, and presented for ease of access.
In Canada, the question of whether ordering Google to de-index a specific 
site would be “just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case” was the 
key issue on the appeal in Equustek.107 Since that case dealt with a preliminary 
injunction, the Court only commented on its capacity to issue an order compelling 
a non-party (Google) to cease facilitating the harm caused by the defendant’s 
site, noting that without a court order Google would continue to facilitate that 
harm.108 Making search engines subject to PIPEDA in a way that might require 
de-indexing of certain sites is a related but not identical question. This question 
is not so much focused on the search engine’s uninvolved facilitation of access 
to content (though the nature of that content is of course highly relevant to the 
determination of whether to de-list, de-index, or refuse a request to do so), but 
rather is focused on the information product that the search engine itself provides 
(namely, the search result list). That is, it imposes data protection obligations 
on the ‘advice’ the search engine provides as to which sites a user may find 
relevant. The results list is itself subject to regulation in the EU as a source, not 
106. Ibid, art 17(3).
107. Equustek, supra note 84 at para 1.
108. Ibid at para 35.
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just as providing neutral reference to other impugned sources, and Canada could 
similarly obligate search engines to de-index sites because pointing users to those 
sites would in itself be a contravention of PIPEDA.
This brings us back again to the question of whether search engines have 
expression rights—including whether those rights primarily stem from the 
rights of their users to hear whatever expression the search engine is entitled 
to produce. In Equustek, Google drew on the SCC’s reasoning in Crookes v 
Newton that providing hyperlinks engages freedom of expression and should 
not incur liability for linking to defamatory content without more active 
promotion by the speaker. Google argued that the list of hyperlinks generated 
by search engine results are protected speech such that, expanding on Crookes, 
any restrictions on providing hyperlinks would intolerably undermine the ability 
of the Internet to function,109 and would impinge on the “the public’s right to 
access information.”110 Presenting hyperlinks in search results, so the argument 
goes, should be immune from legal regulation, because, as the SCC ruled in 
Crookes, “[m]aking reference to the existence and/or location of content by 
hyperlink or otherwise, without more, is not publication of that content,”111 and, 
“[t]he Internet cannot, in short, provide access to information without hyperlinks. 
Limiting their usefulness by subjecting them to the traditional publication 
rule would have the effect of seriously restricting the flow of information and, 
as a result, freedom of expression.”112 The SCC’s ruling in Crookes, however, and 
these passages in particular, apply to “publication” as understood in defamation 
law: That is, whether the person providing the hyperlink is a “publisher” and 
hence liable for disseminating defamatory content. A finding that simply 
providing a hyperlink is not “publication” in this sense does not translate into 
blanket immunity from legal regulation of all hyperlinking practices. If Crookes 
were to be interpreted that broadly, then Google and other search engines would 
never be subject to any legal constraints regarding links, which is clearly not the 
case in Canada, especially after the SCC ruling in Equustek.113
According to the Article 29 Working Party, a key holding of the CJEU in 
the Google Spain decision is that “[t]he processing of personal data carried out in 
the context of the activity of the search engine must be distinguished from, and 
109. Equustek FOA, supra note 89 at paras 30-32.
110. Ibid at para 41.
111. Crookes, supra note 84 at para 42, cited in Equustek FOA, supra note 89 at para 30.
112. Crookes, supra note 84 at para 36.
113. Equustek also makes this point in its factum on appeal. See Equustek FOR, supra note 
89 at para 104.
SLANE,  SEARCH ENGINES AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 373
is additional to that carried out by publishers of third-party websites.”114 While 
there are separate considerations for different kinds of content hosts regarding the 
right to be forgotten and freedom of expression—especially news sources115—
search engine results should be subject to analysis according to what they are 
(a list of materials Google has compiled in relation to a search term entered by a 
particular user) not only in reference to the content they refer to.
The three “right to be forgotten” options really boil down to two main 
possibilities: obscurity of varying degrees (de-listing particular results connected 
to a person’s name, or de-indexing content entirely) and erasure (deleting 
information at its source). It is clear that the right to be forgotten as related 
particularly to search engines is not about imposing liability on information 
intermediaries as publishers. Instead, it is about assigning responsibility to 
participate in finding a solution for information flow problems that the service 
is responsible for creating or enabling. It is about rebalancing the values at 
stake in information flow: Certainly freedom of expression, transparency, and 
cultural memory, but also privacy, identity, and collective support for protecting 
vulnerable people from informational abuse and exploitation.116
II. ONLINE INFORMATION DYNAMICS, PERCEIVED 
POTENTIAL FOR HARM, AND THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN
Digital networked technology and the resulting changes to social interactions 
have produced anxiety or, at the very least, concern and trepidation about 
how personal information becomes and remains publicly available online. This 
anxiety is sometimes caused by exaggeration of the likely results, but it is clearly 
derived from disturbing possibilities. Five features of digital technology are 
particularly relevant to this discussion: (1) permanence, (2) easy accessibility, 
(3)  vast audiences, (4) mysterious processes, and (5) uncontrollability. The 
various versions of the right to be forgotten address the perceived harmful impact 
of these five features, which, in combination with the overall principles of data 
114. WP29 Guidelines, supra note 76 at 2.
115. Ivor Shapiro & Brian MacLeod Rogers, “How the ‘Right to Forgotten’ Challenges 
Journalistic Principles: Privacy, freedom and news durability” (2017) 5:9 Digital 
Journalism 1101.
116. Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2014); Safiya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce 
Racism (New York: New York University Press, 2018).
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protection and an appropriate balance with protection of access to information 
online, form the normative basis for providing such a right.
Fears about online permanence arise from the fact that once data is digital, 
it can be endlessly stored, duplicated, and circulated at almost no cost. The actual 
duration of online information available for access is unpredictable, with much 
of the information disappearing on a regular basis.117 Nonetheless, the possibility 
of permanence has led to many public service campaigns warning youth that the 
Internet is ‘forever’ and to ‘think before they post.’118 These dire warnings intend 
to scare young people from taking risks with their online self-expression, but 
they also highlight a consequence of online permanence: Negative, embarrassing, 
or humiliating information that is permanently available can be exceptionally 
damaging to mental health.119 This negative information blocks longstanding 
therapeutic methods for ‘moving on’ after a trauma, because the trauma never 
really fades into the past.
Self-interested Internet companies have also encouraged the idea of the 
permanence of online data. They claim that attempts to interfere with the flow 
of information online are ineffective because erasing or de-indexing one source 
does not mean that the information will not spring up again in another source. 
While this claim is true, it neglects the fact that a lot of information actually does 
not spring up elsewhere. Although erasing or de-indexing sites is not foolproof, 
it should be considered as, at most uneven, but not universally ineffective.120 
Any measure that disrupts the easy availability of negative information will 
help debunk the idea of permanence, lessen its impact, and thus have positive 
psychological effects on traumatized data subjects.121
The easy accessibility enabled by digital technology refers mainly to the 
success of services like Google, whereby information that might have been 
117. Ambrose, supra note 10 at 372.
118. See e.g. Camille Webb, “Teen ‘Sexting’: Strike a pose. Press send. Regret it forever.” Health 
Leader (14 May 2009), online: The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston 
<www.uthealthleader.org/story/teen-sexting>.
119. Jennifer Martin, “Child Sexual Abuse Images Online: Implications for Social Work Training 
and Practice” (2016) 46:2 Brit J Soc Work 372; Keita Suzuki et al, “Cyberbullying and 
adolescent mental health” (2012) 24:1 Intl J Adolescence Med & Health 27; Ericka Adams, 
Elsa Y Chen & Rosella Chapman, “Erasing the Mark of a Criminal Past: Ex-Offenders’ 
Expectations and Experiences with Record Clearance” (2016) 19:1 Punishment & Soc’y 23.
120. Equustek FOA, supra note 89 at paras 20-21.
121. Jennifer Martin, “Conceptualizing the Harms Done to Children Made the Subjects 
of Sexual Abuse Images Online” (2015) 36:4 Child & Youth Services 267 at 269-71 
[Martin, “Conceptualizing the Harms Done”]; Andrea Slane, “Legal Conceptions of Harm 
Related to Sexual Images Online in the United States and Canada” (2015) 36:4 Child & 
Youth Services 288.
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known to only a small circle of people can become a ‘public fact’ linked to a 
person by a name search.122 Again, public service campaigns have often invoked 
the fear that a person who was not intended to gain access to certain information 
(e.g., a grandmother or a potential employer) will be shocked by what they find 
online about you.123 We now tend to judge people based on online information, 
leading to what some scholars refer to as an overall decline in the quality of 
human interactions as technology replaces in-person contacts.124 While obscurity 
measures would not necessarily mitigate this trend, they could reinforce 
informational boundaries and protect contextual integrity by making some 
personal information harder to find again.125
The issue of easy accessibility was central to Globe24h. The commercial 
activities the site engaged in (such as selling advertising and charging fees to remove 
content from the site) were based on republishing court and tribunal decisions 
and allowing general search engines (i.e., Google) to index them.126 The Federal 
Court discussed how this business model, which capitalizes on people’s desire to 
remain obscure despite knowing that their information is publicly available in 
legal databases,127 did not comport with the open court principle to which most 
parties to court proceedings are deemed to have consented or at least through 
which they may be obligated to cede their privacy rights. Since the materials 
were already publicly available through free legal databases like CanLII (which 
do not allow their contents to be indexed by search engines), the Federal Court 
found that Globe24h merely violated the complainants’ privacy by making their 
information easily locatable, even to people who were not specifically looking for 
it, without adding anything to the transparency and accountability undergirded 
by the open court principle. This case therefore stands for the idea that the values 
122. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, “The Case for Online Obscurity” (2013) 101:1 
Cal L Rev 1 at 35; Allyson Haynes Stuart, “Google Search Results: Buried if Not Forgotten” 
(2014) 15:3 NCJL & Tech 463 at 473-74.
123. There are a number of online blogs that give advice to youth regarding their online 
profiles. See e.g. Vanderbilt, “Can it Pass the Grandma Test? 5 Social Media Tips” (Spring 
2016), Vanderbilt Business (blog), online: <https://magazine.owen.vanderbilt.edu/
can-it-pass-the-grandma-test-5-social-media-tips>.
124. See generally Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less 
from Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011); Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation:  
The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (New York: Penguin Press, 2015).
125. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) at 242; Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 2 at 
181-82; Powles, supra note 3 at 598.
126. Globe24h, supra note 5 at paras 10-11, 32-37.
127. Ibid at paras 21, 23.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL376
connected with access to information do not require easy (and hence possibly 
inadvertent) access.128
The vast audiences feature of digital technology refers to the unpredictable 
nature of online information flow, where anyone can pass on anything they have 
encountered to their whole list of online contacts or to the public at large. When 
something goes “viral,” it has caught on to some hard-to-predict hook that inspires 
people to pass it on en masse.129 A related digital phenomenon is the flourishing 
“subculture of humiliation,” wherein viewing and commenting upon embarrassing 
photos or information about others (who are often strangers) has become a popular 
form of entertainment.130 This can lead to anxiety about searches not only by 
friends, family, or peers, but also by strangers. The psychological consequence of 
feeling like ‘everyone knows’ about some sensitive personal information is another 
well-documented barrier to overcoming a  negative or traumatic experience.131 
Erasure of sensitive personal information at the source aims to eliminate the 
audience. Even obscurity measures can reduce the size of the audience and in 
particular can help to reduce the incidence of connecting humiliating information 
with a person’s name.132
128. Ibid at paras 70, 75-76. See also OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4. OPC 
stresses this point as:
[T]here is a difference between having information available to those who explicitly seek it out 
directly from source websites for specific purposes (for example, a lawyer doing jurisprudential 
research in CanLII or a journalist seeking out past articles on a given issue), and, the same 
information being “stumbled upon” or “fished out” by a snooping friend, colleague, neighbor 
or other acquaintance through a simple query search by an individual’s name (ibid).
129. See generally Karine Nahon & Jeff Hemsley, Going Viral (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 2013).
130. Brian Leiter, “Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech” in Saul Levmore & 
Martha C Nussbaum, eds, The Offensive Internet: Speech, Privacy, and Reputation (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010) 155; Policy and Research Group of the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Online Reputation: What are they saying about me? 
(Gatineau, Que: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2016) at 2; Nicolaus Mills, 
“Television and the Politics of Humiliation,” Dissent 51:3 (July 2004) 79, online: <www.
dissentmagazine.org/article/television-and-the-politics-of-humiliation>; See also Citron, 
supra note 116.
131. Martin, “Conceptualizing the Harms Done,” supra note 121 at 269-71; Ganaele Langlois 
& Andrea Slane, “Economies of reputation: the case of revenge porn” (2017) 14:2 
Comm & Crit/Cult Stud 120 [Langlois & Slane, “Economies of Reputation”]; Julia 
von Weiler, Annette Haardt-Becker & Simone Schulte, “Care and treatment of child 
victims of child pornographic exploitation (CPE) in Germany” (2010) 16:2 J Sexual 
Aggression 211 at 216-18.
132. Andrea Slane & Ganaele Langlois, “Debunking the Myth of ‘Not My Bad’: Sexual Images, 
Consent, and Online Host Responsibilities in Canada,” 30:1 CJWL 42 [Slane & Langlois, 
“Debunking the Myth”]; Slane, “Information Brokers,” supra note 40.
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The mysterious nature of information processing in digital technology refers 
to the phenomenon of data mining, whereby companies (and governments) 
amass tremendous amounts of data regarding online activities that are or can 
be linked to a particular user. The secret nature of this processing—including 
what information has been collected and how it is being used—is also linked 
with the “surveillance society” effect.133 It is a companion of the “attention 
economy” that creates value out of immaterial labour, using the actions of 
viewers to generate profit for companies who know how to direct the public’s 
attention or turn people’s viewing habits into valuable aggregated data about 
consumer behaviour.134 The algorithms that produce search engine results are 
protected as trade secrets, a “black box” that is resistant to transparency and 
accountability.135 For example, in Google Spain, it is not clear why a small 
newspaper announcement about an auction would turn up eleven years later in 
a search of Costeja González’s name. It might have been related to the popularity 
of other items that were made available through the newspaper archive at the 
time or perhaps to the high relevance of Costeja González’s name to the limited 
content of that short announcement. Google’s closely guarded algorithm makes 
this guesswork.136
Finally, the uncontrollability of digital technology is related to various factors. 
Not only is there a lack of control in relation to big data, private individuals can 
also disseminate vast amounts of content, including content containing sensitive 
personal information of others, while facing few, if any, constraints. Social media, 
in particular, has led to two (sometimes toxic and interrelated) trends that are 
fostered by the easy ability to anonymize online postings and the historical 
reluctance of online platforms to interfere with user-generated content. First, 
social media encourages a logic of popularity and consumption (amassing “likes” 
and “re-tweets”). Second, it fosters online incivility, “trolling,” and shaming. 
133. David Lyon, “Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique” 
(2014) 1:2 Big Data & Soc 1; See generally Bennett et al, supra note 24; Daniel Trottier, 
“Interpersonal Surveillance on Social Media” (2012) 37:2 Can J Comm 319.
134. Thomas H Davenport & John C Beck, Attention Economy: Understanding the New 
Currency of Business (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001). For a critique, see 
Kenneth Rogers, The Attention Complex: Media, Archeology, Method (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014).
135. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and 
Information (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2015).
136. Ibid; Engin Bozdag, “Bias in algorithmic filtering and personalization” (2013) 15:3 Ethics 
& Info Tech 209.
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As an example of the “subculture of humiliation” phenomenon, social media 
actually rewards people for being mean in a catchy way.137
The presumed uncontrollability of user behaviour is an affordance and a 
choice, rather than a necessity. Technology companies that run the search engine 
platforms regularly distinguish themselves based on their formula for curating 
content, as well as their enabling of user expression.138 It is clear now that claims 
like “information wants to be free” and “there is no privacy, get used to it,” 
reflect a manufactured rather than a natural absence of control.139 This tension 
is especially evident in the United States, where there is a preference for market 
solutions to private sector problems. Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA) enshrined immunity for intermediaries from many, though not all 
forms of legal regulation. The legislation’s original aim was to encourage hosts 
and platforms to curate content to filter out objectionable material according to 
their users’ preferences.140 By design, the legislation prefers some forms of content 
to others: It preserves liability for intellectual property infringement, federal law, 
and some state criminal law, while deliberately eschewing others (for instance, 
there is no liability for civil actions that would require the intermediary to be 
deemed a “publisher” of third-party content).141 Danielle Keats Citron notes 
that the immunity provided has sheltered businesses that capitalize on the worst 
impulses of human expression, expressly to facilitate “cyber cesspools.”142 Taken 
together, the outcomes of section 230 of the CDA demonstrate how political 
137. One particularly noxious form of popular online humiliation is websites dedicated to 
“revenge porn,” where users are encouraged to post sexual images of other people without 
their consent and other users are encouraged to comment on those photographs. See Langlois 
& Slane, “Economies of Reputation,” supra note 131; Scott R Stroud, “The Dark Side of 
the Online Self: A Pragmatist Critique of the Growing Plague of Revenge Porn” (2014) 29:3 
J Mass Media Ethics 168. Dedicated revenge porn websites can be considered a form of 
social media in that they are primarily dedicated to user-generated content, though similar 
dynamics of user posting and user commentary occur on more traditional social media 
platforms as well. See “Facebook warned over legal action after revenge porn case,” BBC News 
(13 January 2018), online: <www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-42675036>.
138. Grimmelmann, supra note 91 at 875.
139. Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 
2006) at 24. For an example of platforms claiming “there is no privacy, get used to it,” 
see Polly Sprenger, “Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It,’” Wired (26 January 1999), online: 
<www.wired.com/1999/01/sun-on-privacy-get-over-it>. See also Jack Goldsmith & 
Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2006).
140. Citron, supra note 116 at 170-71.
141. Communications Decency Act, 47 USC § 230 (1996) [CDA].
142. Citron, supra note 116 at 171-72.
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choices about what information flows are or are not interfered with do not ‘break 
the Internet’—it is the way Internet design has always operated, and alternative 
choices are available.143
The policy that intermediaries should not be liable for hosting or otherwise 
enabling third-party content is no doubt important to encourage the development 
of these services; otherwise, they would be unduly hampered by the burden of 
having to filter harmful content to avoid liability.144 However, this does not mean 
that these services have no responsibility for their dealings with that content. 
Once the public availability of personal information has been determined to be 
harmful or, as in the EU, to violate a data subject’s fundamental rights in ways 
that are not trumped by the rights of the content provider or the public to have 
access to that information, these services can and have been obligated to act in 
the data subject’s interest.
Search engines are responsible for the specific type of information processing 
that involves harms or rights infringements arising from ranking information 
located elsewhere in a way that brings that information, especially the most 
highly ranked results, to the users’ attention. When inappropriate information is 
highly ranked, this can be the result of a failure of the algorithm (which is perhaps 
what happened in Costeja González’s case). Alternatively, the algorithm might be 
successful, but it fails to consider factors that might be crucial to appropriate 
information flow (e.g., factors related to harm or risk of harm to subjects, 
as discussed above in Part II).145 In that sense, when search engines like Google 
either voluntarily or by compulsion de-list or de-index content or manipulate 
search results for particular terms, they recognize that they have both the power 
and the responsibility to correct at least some of these failures or oversights.
As noted above in Part I(A), in Equustek Google argued that its “reporting 
to users the existence of publicly accessible websites” is speech that should be 
protected by the Charter, and that the users’ speech rights are infringed whenever 
a law prevents them “from using Google’s search engine to find and access 
143. Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet: And How to Stop It (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008).
144. There is a qualitative difference between imposing liability on intermediaries for hosting 
merely third-party content or for hyperlinking, and imposing responsibilities on businesses 
that collect, process, and package personal information for profit (e.g., returning search 
results). For a discussion on hyperlinking and defamation liability, see Crookes, supra 
note 84 at para 42.
145. Gratton & Polentsky, supra note 13 at 18-24.
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information that is publicly available on the Internet.”146 However, in addition 
to ignoring the fact that users routinely do not “find and access information 
that is publicly available on the Internet” (since Google already manipulates 
search results), this argument presumes that users have a right to access the links 
that Google would no longer suggest in its results, which is not necessarily the 
case. All Canadian regimes dealing with information flow—from the Charter 
to PIPEDA to access to information legislation147—consider access to personal 
information, especially sensitive personal information, to be justifiably subject 
to greater limitations than access to other forms of information. Information is 
considered sensitive when there is a high likelihood that its public release would 
cause the data subject harm.148 The right to be forgotten—including as applied 
to search engines—can be implemented in the same spirit as these other access 
to information regimes, whereby the right to access is tempered by important 
competing values concerned with shielding data subjects from harm. While 
Google should certainly be sheltered by the concept of “innocent dissemination,” 
it should also be required, in appropriate circumstances, to participate in achieving 
a better balance between the various values at stake in personal information flow.
III. INFORMATION FLOW OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS IN 
CANADA
As should be evident by now, the most controversial aspects of the right to 
be forgotten arise from what is often characterized as the manipulation of 
access to publicly available information online. The controversy is fanned by 
the fact that in the United States, information that has gone public—even if 
illegally so—is often considered fair game for publication and republication.149 
146. Equustek FOA, supra note 89 at para 27. The debate about the contours of “machine speech” 
is relevant in different ways in the United States and in Canada. This is because recognizing 
that search results are “speech” does not place insurmountable burdens on finding a balance 
with other values like privacy and identity rights in Canada. See Tim Wu, “Machine Speech” 
(2013) 161:6 U Pa L Rev 1495; Stuart Minor Benjamin, “Algorithms and Speech” (2013) 
161:6 U Pa L Rev 1445; Eugene Volokh & Donald M Falk, “Google: First Amendment 
Protection for Search Engine Search Results” (2012) 8:4 JL Econ & Pol’y 883; Frank 
Pasquale, “Search as Speech: Two Scenarios” (29 May 2012), Concurring Opinions (blog), 
online: <concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/05/search-as-speech-two-scenarios.html>.
147. At the federal level, the legislation governing access to information is the Access to Information 
Act, RSC 1985, c A-1. All provinces have comparable access to information legislation 
addressing provincial and municipal governments.
148. Paul Ohm, “Sensitive Information” (2015) 88:5 S Cal L Rev 1125 at 1133.
149. Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohn, 420 US 469 (1975) [Cox Broadcasting]; Florida Star v BJF, 491 
US 524 (1989) [Florida Star]; Smith v Daily Mail Pub Co, 443 US 97 (1999) [Daily Mail].
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Further, some material that is legally suppressed (e.g., defamatory content) is 
allowed more leeway online than offline. The adaptation of the “single publication 
rule” to online contexts has ensured that despite the fact that information on 
the Internet is potentially ‘forever,’ the statute of limitations runs from the 
first time that material is published online.150 Further, the CDA section 230 
immunity has been held to apply even when the host of the defamatory content 
shares the publication incentives with the original speaker.151 Of course, even 
in the United States, some online information flows can be legally suppressed 
(e.g.,  child pornography, material that infringes copyright, and other illegal 
content). However, a larger swath of information cannot be legally suppressed 
once it is ‘out there.’
Because Canada has approached the regulation of personal information flow 
in public forums differently than the United States, there are potentially different 
values to consider and different choices to make when weighing options regarding 
the right to be forgotten. Additionally, although Canadian jurisprudence on 
the freedom of expression rights of recipients of others’ personal information is 
sparse, it leans towards deeming limitations on access of personal information to 
be justified. Most of the Canadian jurisprudence on listeners is about regulating 
content deemed to be generally harmful (e.g., obscenity, hate speech, and 
manipulative commercial speech), where the value of the speech is reduced by its 
derogation from the autonomy of the listeners themselves due to its potentially 
manipulative character.152 Defamation jurisprudence similarly affords speakers 
leeway to engage in “responsible communication on matters of public interest,” 
in part because the “responsible” quality supports listener autonomy, enabling 
listeners to reasonably judge for themselves.153 Privacy-invasive content has been 
treated differently. In the seminal SCC case Aubry v Éditions Vice-Versa Inc, which 
is rooted in Quebec’s greater privacy protections, the Court considered the public’s 
right to access expression (in this case, a photograph of the plaintiff published by 
the defendant magazine). The Court held that the rights of the photo subject to 
determine whether to consent to the publication outweighed the public’s right to 
150. Lori A Wood, “Cyber-Defamation and the Single Publication Rule” (2001) 81:4 BUL Rev 
895; Sapna Kumar, “Website Libel and the Single Publication Rule” (2003) 70:2 U Chicago 
L Rev 639; Adeline A Allen, “Twibel Retweeted: Twitter Libel and the Single Publication 
Rule” (2014) 15:1 J High Tech L 63.
151. Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F Supp 44 at 51-52 (DDC 1998). For critical discussion of this 
overly generous approach to CDA s 230 immunity, see Felix Wu, “Collateral Censorship and 
the Limits of Intermediary Immunity” (2011) 87:1 Notre Dame L Rev 293.
152. Richard Moon, “Justified Limits on Free Expression: The Collapse of the General Approach 
to Limits on Charter Rights” (2002) 40:3&4 Osgoode Hall LJ 337.
153. Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 SCC 61 at paras 51-57, [2009] 3 SCR 640 [Grant].
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see that photograph. In other words, the public’s right to receive that expression 
was not strong enough to override the need to obtain consent, even though the 
photo did not contain particularly sensitive personal information.154
When exploring these choices, it will be useful to consider three categories 
of publicly available information: (a) material that should not have been made 
public in the first place, (b) material that is on the public record but to which 
access is justifiably restricted, and (c) material that has gained (or regained) greater 
prominence than it warrants because of the unpredictable way that information 
dynamics and the algorithms that mine this material work online.155
D. MATERIAL THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC IN THE FIRST 
PLACE
Several categories of personal information are prohibited from being published in 
Canada, including non-consensual publication of intimate images,156 voyeuristic 
154. Aubry v Éditions Vice-Versa Inc, [1998] 1 SCR 591 at paras 57, 65, 157 DLR (4th) 577. 
Canada is also beginning to develop case law on privacy torts, including publication of 
private facts. In Ontario’s first case that explicitly endorsed a tort of publication of private 
facts, the court adopted the US test that the publication of the material be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person and “not of legitimate concern to the public.” See Jane Doe 464533 
v ND, 2016 ONSC 541 at paras 46-47, 128 OR (3d) 352. In this case, publication of an 
intimate photograph shared with the defendant in confidence was deemed to be devoid 
of any legitimate public concern. This case involved a defendant who refused to defend 
himself, since he believed that there was no valid cause of action. The judgment has since 
been set aside in order to allow him to present a proper defence. See Jane Doe 464533 v ND, 
2016 ONSC 4920, 276 ACWS (3d) 55; Jane Doe 464533 v ND, 2017 ONSC 127, 276 
ACWS (3d) 261. While this leaves the original reasons regarding the availability of a tort of 
publication of private facts in limbo, it does not directly invalidate them as an indication of 
the willingness of Ontario courts to recognize this tort.
155. These classifications are similar to those proposed by the OPC as being among the 
circumstances where search engines could be required to de-list or de-index results, namely 
where the “content is unlawful, or unlawfully published” and “[w]here the accessibility 
of the information may cause significant harm to the individual, and there is either no 
public interest associated with the display of the search result, or the harm, considering its 
magnitude and likelihood of occurrence, outweighs any public interest.” See OPC, Draft 
OPC Position, supra note 4.
156. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 162.1(1) [Criminal Code]. Section 162.1(1) states:
Everyone who knowingly publishes, distributes, transmits, sells, makes available or advertises 
an intimate image of a person knowing that the person depicted in the image did not give their 
consent to that conduct, or being reckless as to whether or not that person gave their consent 
to that conduct [commits an offence].
 A public interest defence is also set out (ibid, s 162.1(3)).
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images,157 sensitive information that carries a high risk of identity theft 
(e.g., financial identifiers, signatures, and account numbers),158 and information 
held by trusted data custodians (e.g., personal health information).159 In general, 
publication of materials in these categories is considered to harm or risk harm to 
the data subject to a degree that outweighs the freedom of expression interests 
of the speakers and recipients. The Canadian government’s consultation paper 
on voyeurism, for instance, rationalizes the creation of a criminal offence for 
the dissemination of images that qualify as voyeuristic, stating that “[t]he harm 
generated by criminal voyeurism is amplified when the visual representations are 
transmitted or distributed to other persons.”160 Search engines that facilitate user 
access to such harmful materials similarly amplify those harms.
The long process of creating the new offence of non-consensual distribution of 
intimate images, both in Canada and the United States, reflects the difficulties that 
persist in separating limited distribution from wider publication (here, allowing 
limited consensual sharing of sexual images, but punishing non-consensual 
wider dissemination of these images). Initially, the common response to victims’ 
complaints was to blame them for their own misfortune, deploying the trope 
of uncontrollability noted above in Part II—i.e., once an image exists, you no 
157. Ibid, s 162(4). Section 162(4) states:
Everyone commits an offence who, knowing that a recording was obtained by the commission 
of an offence under subsection (1), prints, copies, publishes, distributes, circulates, sells, 
advertises or makes available the recording, or has the recording in his or her possession for 
the purpose of printing, copying, publishing, distributing, circulating, selling or advertising it 
or making it available.
 A public interest defence is also set out (ibid, s 162(6)).
158. Ibid, s 402.2(2). Section 402.2(2) states:
Everyone commits an offence who transmits, makes available, distributes, sells or offers for sale 
another person’s identity information, or has it in their possession for any of those purposes, 
knowing that or being reckless as to whether the information will be used to commit an 
indictable offence that includes fraud, deceit or falsehood as an element of the offence.
159. Provincial offences address this issue. See e.g. Personal Health Information Protection Act, 
2004, SO 2004, c 3, Sch A, s 72. This Ontario legislation makes it an offence to collect, 
use, or disclose personal health information. Penalties are fines up to $100,000 for a natural 
person and up to $500,000 for a non-natural person (ibid, s 72(2)).
160. Department of Justice Canada, Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence: A Consultation Paper 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2002) at 11, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/voy/
index.html>. As social media technology evolves, further adjustments to the balance 
between freedom of expression and privacy in public continue. See e.g. Robson Fletcher, 
“Social media ‘creep’ accounts flourish at the murky intersection of privacy rights and 
free speech,” CBC News (16 June 2017) online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/
canadacreep-laws-public-photography-voyeurism-1.4160436>.
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longer have control over it, nor are you entitled to, so do not take sexual photos to 
begin with.161 As noted above in Part II, the notion of irretrievable loss of control 
can have devastating consequences on a subject’s mental health. The inherent 
popularity of pornography, combined with the subculture of humiliation, has 
led many women who are portrayed in such images to fear permanent and 
widespread destruction of their online identities.162 In these instances, the right to 
be forgotten in the form of erasure from the source sites—and de-indexing from 
search engines when the hosts refuse to comply—provides an important remedy. 
Since 2015, most search engines and social media platforms have declared their 
voluntary policy to take down such images upon request by the subject.163 The 
right to be forgotten would therefore need to be applied only when a search 
engine or another platform has refused to remove the images.
Material that is prohibited from publication should already be required to 
be deleted at the source, because knowingly hosting such material online should 
be considered dissemination.164 Where the host is a true intermediary and 
does not monitor the content posted by users, this liability applies (as it does 
with most criminal offences) only when the host gains knowledge of its part in 
disseminating that material.165 Similarly, search engines should be required to 
de-index sites that contain such information where hosts have not complied with 
their obligation to take the material down. Because this category of information 
has already been considered in relation to countervailing expression interests, 
161. Langlois & Slane, “Economies of Reputation,” supra note 131 at 124-25; Danielle Keats 
Citron & Mary Anne Franks, “Criminalizing Revenge Porn” (2014) 49:2 Wake Forest L Rev 
345 at 348, 354.
162. Langlois & Slane, “Economies of Reputation,” supra note 131 at 126; Samantha Bates, 
“Revenge Porn and Mental Health: A Qualitative Analysis of the Mental Health Effects 
of Revenge Porn on Female Survivors” (2017) 12:1 Fem Criminology 22 at 23; Amanda 
Lenhart, Michele Ybarra & Myeshia Price-Feeney, Nonconsensual Image Sharing: One in 25 
Americans Has Been a Victim of “Revenge Porn” (New York: Data & Society Research Institute 
& Centre for Innovative Public Health Research, 2016) at 4.
163. Amit Singhal, “‘Revenge Porn’ and Search” (19 June 2015), Google Public Policy Blog (blog), 
online: <www.googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2015/06/revenge-porn-and-search.html>; 
Techworld Staff, “Reddit to crack down on mean feeds” (17 July 2015), Techworld (blog), online: 
<www.techworld.com/news/apps/reddit-to-crack-down-on-objectionable-content-3620006>.
164. In the United States, even blatant “revenge porn” hosts have taken shelter behind s 230 of the 
CDA. See CDA, supra note 141. I have argued elsewhere that revenge porn hosts in Canada 
should not be protected from liability where their business model expressly encourages 
this grave form of privacy violation. See Slane & Langlois, “Debunking the Myth,” 
supra note 132.
165. Knowledge and control are the component parts of possession at law, such as for the offence 
of possession of property obtained by crime. See Criminal Code, supra note 156, s 354(1).
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requiring the assistance of intermediaries and search engines that generally (or 
specifically) profit from information dissemination merely acknowledges their 
role in both the problem and its solution.166
Defamation, as another category of information in which further 
publication is prohibited,167 is stickier. Canadian law is still revising what counts 
as defamatory, what defences are available, and who is a publisher.168 Recent 
revisions indicate that the freedom of expression interests are stronger here than 
in the above categories of materials for which dissemination is categorically 
prohibited. Enlisting the help of intermediaries and search engines to suppress 
defamatory material should continue to require a court order on a case-by-case 
basis. Following Equustek, judges would need to determine whether enlisting the 
assistance of search engines or other service providers is appropriate and specify 
what form that assistance should take (e.g., de-listing, de-indexing, or erasure).
In other words, the right to be forgotten can in many cases be unproblematically 
applied in cases involving materials where publication or republication is already 
prohibited. This is because freedom of expression interests have been considered 
and limits on the public’s right to access this information have been justified in 
favour of the data subject’s dignity-based privacy and identity interests.
E. MATERIAL THAT IS PUBLIC BUT WITH JUSTIFIABLE ACCESS 
RESTRICTIONS
The second category of publicly available information involves material that is 
on the public record, but for which Canadian law or policy has implemented 
access restrictions to honour competing values.169 These materials can be divided 
into two subcategories. The first includes materials that have been traditionally 
subject to the right to oblivion in Europe, based on the value of allowing a person 
to no longer be judged by past mistakes (“clean slate”). The second subcategory 
includes materials containing personal information that are available to the 
public to honour the “open court” principle. These materials are limited by access 
and publication restrictions to help shield the privacy of some of the people 
involved in a case.
166. See Equustek, supra note 84 at paras 31, 35, 73. The SCC reviews the case law supporting the 
capacity of Canadian courts to issue court orders compelling non-parties to assist plaintiffs in 
enforcing their rights where the non-party facilitates the wrongdoing of a defendant.
167. Publication to a third party is a component of the tort of defamation. See Grant, supra note 
153 at para 28.
168. WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 SCR 420; Grant, supra note 153; 
Crookes, supra note 84.
169. Slane, “Information Brokers,” supra note 40.
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With regard to the “clean slate” category, Canada, like many other 
jurisdictions, has well-developed and long-acknowledged justifications for 
disallowing a person’s past mistakes from following them forever in certain 
well-delineated circumstances. Pardons, restrictions on disclosure and use of 
juvenile criminal records, as well as bankruptcies and credit information all 
follow variants of the “clean slate” policies, for the good of both individuals and 
society as a whole.
Pardons, or record suspensions as we now call them in Canada, fulfill 
important policy objectives, including reducing crime.170 When the federal 
government was amending the Criminal Records Act171 in 2012, all members 
of the Standing Senate Committee agreed that the record suspension system 
is important and valuable.172 Studies have proven that having criminal history 
information no longer appear on standard criminal record checks will assist in an 
individual’s long-term rehabilitation and reintegration, significantly improve the 
person’s overall prospects (health, financial, and family relationships), and reduce 
the likelihood of re-offending.173 This effect in turn benefits the public because a 
person granted a record suspension is far more likely to find gainful employment 
and other social stability, and thus the individual would be less likely to become 
re-entangled with the criminal justice system, require social assistance, or suffer 
from substance abuse or other serious mental health issues.174
The impetus for the 2012 amendments to the Criminal Records Act was the 
Conservative federal government’s argument that the system for record suspensions 
was too automatic. To be granted a record suspension, even for egregious crimes, 
a person had to have stayed out of trouble merely for the required number of years 
after serving their sentence. The amendments introduced additional factors that 
the Parole Board could consider, including most significantly whether granting 
a record suspension would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
In other words, the amendments sought to deny record suspensions for morally 
‘unforgiveable’ crimes, both categorical (e.g., sexual crimes against children) 
170. Rick Ruddell & L Tom Winfree, “Setting Aside Criminal Convictions in Canada: 
A Successful Approach to Offender Reintegration” (2006) 86:4 Prison J 452.
171. Criminal Records Act, RSC 1985, c C-47.
172. Senate of Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Bill C-23A, an Act to amend the Criminal Records Act and to make consequential amendments 
to other acts (22 June 2010) (Chair: Joan Fraser), online: <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/
Committee/403/lega/48300-e.htm>.
173. Ibid at Testimony: Harvey Cenaiko; Frank Pasquale, “Reforming the Law of Reputation” 
(2016) 47:2 Loy U Chicago LJ 515 at 535 [Pasquale, “Reforming the Law of Reputation”].
174. Senate of Canada, supra note 172 at Testimony: Heidi Illingworth.
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and individual (e.g., the serial killer Karla Homolka). After these amendments 
became law, the system now issues record suspensions for cases where ‘forgiving’ 
a person’s crime—or more accurately, obscuring it from public knowledge by 
suppressing his or her record from standard criminal record checks—does not 
offend normative moral sensibilities.175
The criminal records of a person granted a record suspension are not erased. 
They are suppressed in the Canadian Police Information Centre (“CPIC”) 
database and can be revived if the person commits a further offence. If other 
online information about that individual is limited and if the arrest or conviction 
was reported in a news source, it is certainly possible that the conviction will turn 
up in search results of that person’s name, long after the sentence or resolution 
is completed. Our freedom of expression values may militate against subjecting 
news sources to erasure and by extension would not tolerate de-indexing news 
sites that house historical articles. However, the option of de-linking a reference 
to a person’s past convictions in his or her name search upon the granting of his or 
her record suspension would be appropriate to fulfill the other important policy 
goals noted above in this Subpart. As with the criminal record, the historical 
record is preserved and is simply less automatically linked to current searches 
for information about that individual. This is in effect what the CJEU decided 
in Google Spain, and that approach would fit well within the Canadian record 
suspensions regime.
Credit and bankruptcy information is more complicated. Canada, like many 
jurisdictions, limits the amount of time that negative financial information can 
be used to assess the creditworthiness of a consumer.176 However, with big data 
processing numerous data sources, the algorithms that assess creditworthiness 
by mining and aggregating public online information are even more mysterious 
than search results from a search engine. As Frank Pasquale pointed out, the 
removal of bankruptcy information from credit reports is undermined if 
that information continues to influence “lead generators’ or social networks’ 
175. Ibid at Testimony: Honourable Vic Toews. Similarly, we suppress records of a juvenile 
offender (in addition to issuing publication bans and otherwise limiting access to juvenile 
criminal conviction records) on the belief that a young person has far better prospects of 
turning his or her life around and living a productive life if these events can be put behind an 
informational barrier. See Canada, Department of Justice, “Youth Records,” online:  
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/tools-outils/sheets-feuillets/recor-dossi.html> (referring to 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1 [YCJA]).
176. See Consumer Reporting Act, RSO 1990, c C.33, s 9(3). Section 9(3) sets out information not 
to be included in a credit report. The time limit for relevant financial information is generally 
seven years (ibid).
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assessments of creditworthiness, and would-be lenders are in some way privy to 
those or similar reputational reports.”177 He noted that these types of background 
data processing, like the formulas that yield search results, are “automated, 
algorithmic arrangements of information, which could render a data point 
removed or obscured in one records system, and highly visible or dominant in 
other, more important ones.”178 For credit information, the “clean slate” policy 
regarding outdated information can be enforced only when consumers know 
what information is contained in their digital dossier—as they would if some of 
that information turned up in search results of their name—and have a means to 
object to further processing.
As with protected yet public information, a bankruptcy that was reported in 
a public news source does not need to be erased at its source. Instead, as in Google 
Spain, outdated financial information that has been publicly reported needs to 
be subjected to an analysis of public interest to determine whether de-listing 
the reference to that news source upon a search of the data subject’s name is 
appropriate. Alternatively, the search engine’s algorithm could be tweaked 
to adjust the ranking of such information. This would in effect demote 
the information rather than de-link it as it ages.179 As with criminal records, 
if further financial troubles plague the data subject, the relevance of past financial 
troubles would increase again. Multiple bankruptcies are certainly relevant to an 
individual wanting to do business with a data subject; therefore, easier access to 
this information would be in the public interest.
The main countervailing interest for the second category of public records 
to which Canadian law or policy justifiably limits access is the value of open 
courts—that public observation can ensure justice is properly served. Restrictions 
on publication have been discussed in two main arenas: the extensive Canadian 
jurisprudence on publication bans and the more recent discussions of online 
court decision databases, as in the case of Globe24h.
Publication bans differ greatly between Canada and the United States. 
Canada allows publication bans based on privacy and identity interests for victims 
of sexual assault, as well as for juvenile offenders, their victims, and any witnesses 
in juvenile criminal proceedings. Additionally, publication bans in Canada are 
mandatory for information that could identify complainants or witnesses in 
sexual assault trials upon the request of the complainant, witness, or prosecutor.180 
177. Pasquale, “Reforming the Law of Reputation,” supra note 173 at 516.
178. Ibid.
179. Powles, supra note 3 at 599; Ambrose, supra note 10.
180. Criminal Code, supra note 156, s 486.4(1)-(2).
SLANE,  SEARCH ENGINES AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 389
Judges can decide to issue such an order even without a request.181 Judges can 
also impose publication bans on information that can identify any victim of 
crime who is under eighteen.182 Publication of the identity of a young person 
who is an accused, victim, or witness in a youth justice matter is automatically 
prohibited.183 Although members of the public are generally permitted to attend 
any of these hearings and view (but not photocopy) court documents, the fact 
that the person’s identity is available to the public in the courtroom and in 
documents housed at the court does not preclude a prohibition on broader public 
dissemination. These publication bans are considered a justifiable restriction 
on freedom of expression that protects the privacy and identity interests of 
the people concerned. They help to shield young offenders from the stigma 
that serves as a barrier to rehabilitation, encourage victims to report sensitive 
crimes, and encourage witnesses to participate in the justice process, while at the 
same time valuing the transparency and accountability supported by the open 
court principle.
The United States takes a very different approach to publication bans and 
the responsibilities of publishers. Several United States Supreme Court rulings 
have confirmed that once information has been released, even illegally, its further 
publication cannot be prohibited without falling afoul of the First Amendment.184 
Parties must make applications to the court or avail themselves of standing 
court policies to protect identity interests, e.g., to keep names and images of 
sexual assault victims out of public records, close the courtroom during witness 
testimony, grant alternative methods to provide testimony (such as by video), 
or seal records.185 In other words, the responsibility for protecting a person’s 
identity lies entirely with the government; publishers have no legal obligation to 
do so. Mainstream news outlets usually have ethical guidelines about identifying 
victims. However, one study found that more than 50 per cent of news articles 
about child victims of sexual or other abuse included identifying information, 
181. Ibid, s 486.5(1).
182. Ibid, s 486.4(2.1).
183. YCJA, supra 173, s 110. The ban can be lifted if the young person is given an adult sentence, 
or if a judge determines it is in the public interest to disclose his or her identity in relation to 
having committed a violent crime.
184. Cox Broadcasting, supra note 149; Florida Star, supra note 149; Daily Mail, supra note 149.
185. National Crime Victim Law Institute, Confidentiality and Sexual Violence Survivors: A Toolkit 
for State Coalitions (Portland: NCVLI, 2005).
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despite research that strongly suggests that publicity is highly detrimental to the 
recovery of these victims.186
Canada can therefore enforce publication bans on online publishers in 
ways that are unavailable in the United States. Intermediaries and information 
location services like search engines can be enlisted to enforce publication 
bans meaningfully: Upon notice, any host or search engine could be required 
to delete or de-index a source that violates a publication ban. The balancing 
of freedom of expression interests with protecting privacy, identity, and the 
administration of justice has already been carried out in issuing the publication 
ban (which can, of course, be challenged in itself ). Therefore, hosting further 
publications or making this material easy to find does not revive new freedom 
of expression interests that have not already been considered in granting the 
application for the ban.
The second arena for protecting the privacy and identity interest of people 
whose names and other personal information appear in public court documents 
involves online court decision databases.187 These databases have policies that do 
not allow their sites to be collectively indexed by search engines (i.e., each site 
has its own internal search tool). In Globe24h, the website republished Canadian 
court decisions and allowed them to be indexed by search engines, while charging 
a fee to individuals who wanted to have their documents removed from the 
site, as well as generating revenue from advertising.188 The OPC and in turn 
the Federal Court rejected Globe24h’s claim that it fell within the “journalistic 
purpose” exception to the application of PIPEDA, as well as the “publicly available 
documents” exception to the requirement to obtain the data subject’s consent.189
186. Lisa M Jones, David Finkelhor & Jessica Beckwith, “Protecting victims’ identities in press 
coverage of child victimization” (2010) 11:3 Journalism 347 at 353.
187. See generally Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Electronic Disclosure of Personal 
Information in the Decisions of Administrative Tribunals (Guidance Document) (Ottawa: 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2010), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/media/4082/
gd_trib_201002_e.pdf> [OPC, Electronic Disclosure]; Canadian Judicial Council – Judges 
Technology Advisory Committee, Model Policy for Access to Court Records in Canada 
(Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 2005), online: <www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/
news_pub_techissues_AccessPolicy_2005_en.pdf> [CJC, Model Policy].
188. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Website that generates revenue by 
republishing Canadian court decisions and allowing them to be indexed by search engines 
contravened PIPEDA, PIPEDA Report of Findings #2015-002 (Ottawa: Office 
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 5 June 2015), online <www.priv.gc.ca/
en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2015/
pipeda-2015-002>.
189. Ibid at para 68.
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In evaluating the defendant’s claim to shelter under the “publicly available 
documents” exception to the requirement to secure consent, the Federal Court 
endorsed the OPC’s reasoning that court and tribunal websites, as well as free 
legal databases like CanLII and SOQUIJ, do not allow their sites to be indexed 
by search engines. The main reason for this restriction is that “in spite of the 
importance of individuals’ electronic access to judgments, that a restriction 
against web indexing is necessary to address a serious risk to individual privacy, 
and that the benefits of such a restriction outweigh the negative impacts on the 
open courts principle.”190 The OPC and in turn the Federal Court concluded 
that inadvertently finding court decisions through searches of a person’s name on 
a general search engine does not further the open court principle, and so it does 
not comport with the purpose for making these decisions available to the public 
in the first place.191 The Federal Court thus issued the order that would allow the 
complainant to appeal to Google to de-list the site.192
A complicating fact in the circumstances of this case is that in the meantime, 
Globe24h has discontinued its practice of charging fees to remove individual 
documents from the site and appears to have ceased to solicit advertising. If the 
website is no longer a commercial venture, it may not be subject to PIPEDA 
obligations in Canada anymore, since the data protection legislation only applies 
to organizations engaged in commercial activities.193 This development speaks to 
the need to apply PIPEDA to Google directly, since Google remains a commercial 
venture that would otherwise continue to provide links to a newly non-commercial 
variant of Globe24h; despite the fact that Globe24h allows indexing of court 
decisions and documents for profit or not, the reasoning regarding balancing of 
privacy, consent, and the open court principle remains the same.194
In principle, the Canadian practice of making court decisions public but 
not endorsing indexing by search engines would be easily achieved by requiring 
190. Ibid at para 85. See also OPC, Electronic Disclosure, supra note 187; CJC, Model Policy, 
supra note 187.
191. Globe24h, supra note 5 at paras 75-76. The Federal Court characterized the allowance of 
general search engines to index court documents as “needless exposure of sensitive personal 
information of participants in the justice system” (ibid at para 76).
192. Ibid at paras 80-96.
193. PIPEDA, supra note 4, s 4.
194. Mark Hayes and Adam Jacobs comment that Globe24h makes an “unnecessary detour” 
into the “appropriate purpose” section of PIPEDA, when the case could have been resolved 
exclusively via the consent requirement. This is a related point to the discussion, though it 
does not tackle the problem of the application of PIPEDA to a website or another service 
that is not commercial. See Mark Hayes & Adam Jacobs, “Forget the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
until the right case comes” (24 March 2017) 36:43 Lawyers Weekly (QL).
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search engines to de-index sites that offer Canadian court documents. This would 
result in a site like Globe24h having to merely follow the same rules that other 
public online court decision databases already voluntarily follow.195
F. MATERIAL THAT IS INAPPROPRIATELY PROMINENT DUE TO THE 
OPERATION OF DYNAMIC SEARCH ALGORITHMS
The third category of publicly accessible material that has been targeted by the 
EU’s right to be forgotten is any information pertaining to a data subject that he 
or she objects to being online. Boldly stated like this, this category takes further 
the principle that data subjects must consent to the public dissemination of 
their personal information, and on its face seems to trample unjustifiably on 
freedom of expression when applied to search engines. Nonetheless, with proper 
justification, an avenue should be explored for redressing instances when the 
search engine’s algorithms have given undue and harmful prominence to sensitive 
personal information. As the OPC puts it, these are circumstances when either 
no public interest exists in access to that information via a name search or “the 
harm, considering its magnitude and likelihood of occurrence, outweighs any 
public interest.”196
The role and functions of search engine algorithms in bringing material to 
public prominence can offer some guidance about when intervention might 
be appropriate. For example, old or minor information is far more likely to be 
prominently displayed on a name search of a person who does not have a very 
substantial online presence, compared to a person who has an active and robust 
online presence. Humiliating personal information may rise to the top of the 
list of a name search of an individual if it is popular, especially if that person 
does not have other significant online content associated with them.197 In some 
cases, like Costeja González’s in Google Spain, the prominence of a particular 
result is hard to explain. In each of these scenarios, the algorithm specifically 
195. Globe24h, supra note 5 at paras 74, 99. See also Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada, Online legal database doesn’t need consent to use publicly available court 
decisions, in support of the open court principle, PIPEDA Report of Findings #2015-013 
(Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 21 September 2015), online <www.priv.
gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2015/
pipeda-2015-013>.
196. OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4.
197. Mary Anne Franks, “Unwilling Avatars: Idealism And Discrimination In Cyberspace” (2011) 
20:2 Colum J Gender & L 224 at 256; Ann Bartow, “Internet Defamation as Profit Center: 
The Monetization Of Online Harassment” (2009) 32:2 Harv JL & Gender 383 at 429; 
Allison Woodruff, “Necessary, Unpleasant, and Disempowering; Reputation Management in 
the Internet Age” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems (Toronto: CHI, 2014) 149, online: <dx.doi.org/10.1145/2556288.2557126>.
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harms an individual’s online identity interests either through its failure to 
return current and relevant results or, even if it yielded successful search results, 
its failure to account for the distorting impact of a data subject’s low online 
prominence relative to the popularity of sites dedicated to public humiliation.198 
If outdated information unreasonably appears prominently in the search results 
of a data subject’s name, granting a right to obscurity could be justified to compel 
correction of such skewed results.199
As Google works through the thousands of de-listing and de-indexing 
requests it continues to receive from European data subjects after Google Spain, 
it must be developing ways to weigh the factors involved in determining whether 
its algorithm is inappropriately promoting content.200 Google reports that the 
most common requests to de-link content pertain to social media and other 
user-generated content. The search engine recognizes that much of this content 
is especially sensitive and damaging but is not of significant public interest; 
therefore, this factor tips the balance of freedom of expression in favour of the 
data subject’s identity and privacy rights.201 However, Google has not been 
forthcoming about the nature of the content pertaining to social media sites 
in these data subject requests. In order to ensure that an appropriate balance 
is struck between freedom of expression and privacy, Google’s decision-making 
processes should be subject to a confidential audit by a neutral authority with 
expertise in both data protection and freedom of expression.
Although such an authority currently does not exist in Canada, the OPC 
suggests that it could potentially fill this role. The OPC further suggests, however, 
that Parliament also study the issue of how an appropriate balance between data 
198. The prominence of negative information in search results is especially acute in relation to 
websites that promote the public accessibility of mugshot photographs. Barry Schwartz 
discusses how Google recently altered its algorithm to demote websites that compiled 
publicly available mugshots for the purposes of entertaining users and, in doing so, 
humiliated the data subjects. See Barry Schwartz, “Google Launches Fix to Stop Mugshot 
Sites from Ranking: Google’s MugShot Algorithm” (7 October 2013), Search Engine Land 
(blog), online: <searchengineland.com/google-launches-fix-to-stop-mugshot-sites-from-
ranking-googles-mugshot-algorithm-173672>. Jane E Bobet discusses the harm caused by 
publicly available mugshots more generally. See Jane E Bobet, “Mug Shots and the FOIA: 
Weighing the Public’s Interest in Disclosure Against the Individual’s Right to Privacy” (2004) 
99:3 Cornell L Rev 633 at 634-35.
199. Ambrose, supra note 10.
200. Google, “Transparency Report,” supra note 79.
201. Gratton and Polonetsky engage in a useful discussion of the meaning of “public interest” 
in Canadian law. For instance, the authors argue that mere curiosity or prurient interest is 
not enough to qualify as publication in the “public interest.” See Gratton & Polonetsky, 
supra note 13 at 35.
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protection principles and freedom of expression could best be achieved.202 The 
emerging principles for determining when and when not to de-list suggest that 
it is possible for the government to develop concrete guidelines for de-listing and 
de-indexing search results that address some of the more egregious problems, 
while still respecting the freedom of expression. However, the question is, who 
would enforce those guidelines when they are not followed?
Many scholars have been wary of granting private companies like Google 
all of the decision-making power in dealing with requests from data subjects 
to have links removed.203 Google prefers this, as all private companies do, 
over government regulation. The OPC however sees imposing data protection 
obligations on search engines to be in keeping with PIPEDA imposing its 
requirements on private companies who are personal information custodians.204 
In this sense, the process established in the wake of Google Spain is a working 
compromise in that Google makes decisions to list or de-list, and requesters can 
appeal to data protection authorities and ultimately courts when they disagree 
with a search engine’s decision.205 However, the avenue for content providers 
to appeal these decisions is less clear. A Canadian variant of this process should 
be simplified in parallel to the data subject’s complaints process.206 Avenues 
for complaints regarding user expression rights currently do not exist, though 
Google (and the OPC) are currently considering factors that appear to bear these 
avenues in mind.
A creative solution may be necessary to resolve these complex issues: 
A neutral arbiter could be created to deal with complaints about online content 
removal, including de-listing and de-indexing. The arbiter can balance the 
interests of all four categories of stakeholders (i.e., service providers, data subjects, 
content providers, and users) and ensure that both data protection principles and 
202. OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4.
203. Powles, supra note 3 at 599; Jones, supra note 23 at 178-79; Gratton & Polonetsky, supra note 
13 at 43. For an argument for the role of neutral arbiters more generally, see Pierre Trudel, 
“La responsabilité sur internet en droit civil québécois” (Report delivered at Le Colloque 
de Droit Civil 2008 de L’institut National de la Magistrature, Ottawa, 13 June 2008) at 1, 
online: <www.pierretrudel.net/files/sites/6/2015/01/TRUDEL_resp_internet.pdf>.
204. OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4.
205. Google FAQs, supra note 74 at FAQ: “What happens if an individual disagrees with 
your decision?”.
206. Google notifies webmasters of URLs that are de-listed but does not name the individual 
requesting the de-listing to protect that person’s privacy as well as the integrity of the process. 
Google states that webmasters who receive such a notice through its “Webmaster Tools” 
can request a re-review of the decision. See ibid at FAQ: “Do webmasters have any way of 
challenging your decisions?”.
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freedom of expression are appropriately honoured. This solution could continue 
to rely largely on the voluntary compliance of search engines (and potentially 
social media platforms) in a “co-regulatory” model—a kind of private-public 
partnership for adjudicating complaints.
A version of this type of co-regulatory approach—albeit with less teeth than 
EU data protection authorities following Google Spain—is the Office of the eSafety 
Commissioner recently established in Australia.207 The eSafety Commissioner 
administers a complaints system addressing a variety of complaints about online 
content, especially pertaining to serious online bullying of Australian children, 
through the voluntary compliance of social media platforms, combined with the 
eSafety Commissioner’s power to broker solutions with uncooperative services 
and its capacity to appeal decisions to courts when a satisfactory resolution 
is not reached. The Office of the eSafety Commissioner has also assumed the 
responsibilities for handling complaints about illegal online content (mainly 
child pornography), statutorily allocated to the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority (“ACMA”). The ACMA staff continues to support the eSafety 
Commissioner in performing some of its mandate, although the Office of the 
eSafety Commissioner operates as a separate, independent entity.208
Like the eSafety Commissioner, a similar co-regulatory regime for complaints 
about online content removal, which includes de-listing and de-indexing, 
could be created in Canada, either as a wholly new entity or as an independent 
office within the OPC. The office could issue guidelines, like those suggested 
207. The Office of the eSafety Commissioner was established by legislation in 2015 as the Office 
of the Children’s e-Safety Commissioner in order to address complaints about cyberbullying 
of young Australians. The mandate was expanded to promote online safety for all Australians 
in 2017. See Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015 (Cth); Enhancing Online Safety for Children 
Amendment Act 2017 (Cth). The Office of the eSafety Commissioner “co-ordinates and 
leads the online safety efforts of government, industry and the not-for-profit community.” 
In addition to serving as a complaints adjudication service for young Australians experiencing 
“serious cyberbullying,” the Office of the eSafety Commissioner now also serves the 
function of identifying and removing illegal online content, including image-based abuse 
(non-consensual pornography). See Office of the eSafety Commissioner, “Role of the 
Office,” online: <www.esafety.gov.au/about-the-office/role-of-the-office>. Some Australian 
legal scholars argue for further expansion of the Office of the eSafety Commissioner’s 
mandate, endorsing the appropriateness of this co-regulatory model for dealing with issues 
like non-consensual pornography and online racism. See Nicolas Suzor, Bryony Seignior & 
Jennifer Singleton, “Non-Consensual Porn and the Responsibilities of Online Intermediaries” 
(2017) 40:3 Melbourne UL Rev 1057 at 1088; Gail Mason & Natalie Czapski, “Regulating 
Cyber-Racism” (2017) 41:1 Melbourne UL Rev 284 at 338.
208. Mason & Czapski, supra note 207 at 308-310; Office of the eSafety Commissioner, “About 
the Office: Legislation,” online: <www.esafety.gov.au/about-the-office/legislation>.
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in this article, for appropriate de-listing, de-indexing, and erasure of personal 
information of Canadian data subjects. The office could further conduct audits 
of decision-making processes and could administer complaints where requesters, 
content providers, or users are not satisfied with the result. Courts could then 
serve as the next layer of enforcement when warranted, just as they do currently 
with PIPEDA complaints.
Canadian courts’ power to issue de-indexing orders to search engines, 
including the global or national reach of such orders, was dealt with by the 
SCC in Equustek.209 As the OPC proposes, a more moderate solution than the 
worldwide order at issue in Equustek is the option for the courts to order search 
engines to employ geo-fencing technologies to de-list or de-index content despite 
the fact that only for people searching from within Canada, as Google currently 
does for its European privacy requests.210 This geographically limited solution 
would still provide significant relief for most Canadian data subjects looking 
to reduce the impact of negative personal information online, because it would 
reduce the likelihood of people close to home viewing that material.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the last twenty years, great innovations in digital information production 
and sharing have revolutionized what we know about each other and how. 
Initially, it was important not to interfere with the development of these 
platforms and services, which are now so thoroughly integrated into our social, 
professional, and personal lives. However, as our ability to harvest, package, and 
present information has matured, so too must our ability to adjust the matrices 
through which private entities process our information.
Search engines will play a central role in this adjustment because they influence 
how most people locate or are exposed to information about others. We know 
that search engines (and social media platforms) use mysterious algorithms to 
highlight certain materials over others. This does not mean that search engines 
and other hosts would become liable for third-party supplied content. Instead, 
privately owned search engines should be required to honour legitimate requests 
to de-link or de-index material that falls into the three categories described 
above in Part III.
209. Equustek, supra note 84 at para 41.
210. Samuel Gibbs, “Google to extend ‘right to be forgotten’ to all its domains accessed in EU,” 
The Guardian (11 February 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/11/
google-extend-right-to-be-forgotten-googlecom>; OPC, Draft OPC Position, supra note 4.
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As Canada considers whether some version of the right to be forgotten can 
respect the Canadian values of privacy, access to information rights, and freedom 
of expression, it is important to consider the consequences of categorically denying 
that businesses that collect, process, and package publicly accessible information 
should be subject to data protection constraints. When protecting our ‘privacy in 
public’ from various forms of public and private sector surveillance, it is important 
not to categorically deny that public information collection and processing 
should be subject to regulation, even though that regulation will necessarily look 
somewhat different than the current data protection regime imposed on private 
sector actors who collect information directly from their customers.
Ultimately, the right to be forgotten, as with all regulation of Internet content 
and activity, is not an either-or, all-or-nothing kind of solution. Canadian law and 
policy regarding information flow has already established a legacy of balancing 
important values and interests. The right to be forgotten is an opportunity 
to bring that legacy to bear on digital technology in our current information 
environment, now and going forward.
